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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines how the growth of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
has led to the development of new public policy in the European Union. While
many political scientists remain skeptical of the efficacy of CSR—questioning, for
example, why companies would choose to self-regulate in any meaningful way
given their profit motive—my research provides evidence for a more optimistic
perspective. Looking in particular at the case of corporate non-financial (i.e. social
and environmental) reporting, the dissertation illustrates the ways in which civil
society organizations have used voluntary standards, not to replace government,
but to drag it into policy areas that have been neglected or ignored. Though most
thinking about CSR puts the firm at the center of analysis, this project demonstrates
that the firm is better understood as the target of other organizations that seek to
push the CSR agenda forward. These organizations play a critical role in both
expanding the regulatory space and changing societal expectations for good cor-
porate behavior. While voluntary standards are often insufficient to reach desired
social and environmental outcomes, my work suggests that their most significant
impact on society and the environment actually occurs via their influence on pub-
iv
lic policy—as what is voluntary becomes expected, and what is expected becomes
mandatory.
The project begins with the observation that the rise in voluntary corporate
non-financial reporting (NFR) in several European countries was followed by the
enactment of new legislation making such practices mandatory. Postulating a
causal relationship between this increase in private regulation and the introduc-
tion of new state regulation, the dissertation proceeds to test this claim using a
mixed-method research design. The first empirical chapter traces the process by
which private regulation leads to a change public policy. Drawing on extensive
fieldwork in Europe, this chapter illustrates the critical role that voluntary stan-
dards played both in establishing the NFR regulatory space and in building the
coalitions necessary for enacting new public policy. The next chapter addresses
the possibility of reverse causation by examining the determinants of firms’ NFR
practices. Using a multilevel data set comprising 2,000 of Europe’s largest listed
companies, the results indicate that it is firm-level factors such as revenue and
sector that primarily drive voluntary reporting; national-level factors play only a
supporting role. The third empirical chapter uses the same multilevel data set to
examine the relationship between voluntary NFR and the development of NFR
legislation at the national level. The results suggest that the popularity of volun-
tary standards represents a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the en-
actment of mandatory legislation in most cases. The final empirical chapter exam-
ines the politics behind the European Union’s 2014 directive on NFR, using public
consultation data to demonstrate how the preferences of business, nonprofit, and
public sector organizations across Europe are rooted in national policy legacies.
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In April 2013, the Rana Plaza building collapsed in Bangladesh, ending the lives
of 1,134 workers in one of the deadliest garment-factory accidents on record. The
building housed numerous factories, supplying well-known brands such as Benet-
ton (from Italy), Carrefour (from France), Primark (from the United Kingdom), and
Walmart (from the United States). Who is responsible for this tragedy?
In this case, the deaths of more than a thousand people are certainly due in
part to the problems of corruption and poor domestic governance in Bangladesh.
It is significant that the Rana Plaza building collapsed in Bangladesh and not in
Germany or Japan. Although there actually were laws on the books that could
have prevented the disaster in this case, they were not enforced. The building itself
violated numerous local regulations, and yet, despite cracks visible on its walls, it
somehow passed inspection just days before its collapse.
While this may be the most proximate cause, it is not the only explanation for
the disaster. Though several factory managers admit that the building may have
been unsafe, their own practices were driven in part by the increasingly difficult
demands set upon them by multinational corporations further down the supply
chain, many of which are headquartered in the comparatively wealthy countries
of Europe and North America. These companies, of course, are in competition with
one another, as they attempt to lower costs and increase production in an effort to
gain consumers and raise their share price. While such competition is critical in
2any capitalist system, many would argue that such cost-cutting should not come
at the expense of workers’ health and safety.
Similarly, one could add that policymakers in advanced industrialized democ-
racies deserve a portion of the blame as well, given the involvement of companies
headquartered in their countries. Although national governments have limited
power to control events outside their borders, which in this case could include the
decision by local authorities in Bangladesh not to enforce safety regulations, they
do have some leverage over companies headquartered in their own territory. If
governments of the “global north” are truly intent on not reproducing their colo-
nialist pasts through the behaviors of their multinational corporations, one might
expect to see national-level regulations governing the behavior of firms involved
in global supply chains.
Finally, the blame for Rana Plaza must, to some degree, extend not only to the
corporate manager that pushes contractors to reduce costs, or to the government
regulator who fails to intervene, but also to the consumers and investors that in-
centivize businesses in the first place. Though they might not have been aware of
the consequences of their actions, the average French citizen shopping for cheap
clothing at Carrefour, or the average American owning shares of Walmart as part
of a mutual fund or retirement account, shoulders at least some portion of the re-
sponsibility.
The tragedy of incidents like this is not simply that they are preventable but also
that they are, regrettably, quite common. Instances of child labor and forced labor
were reported throughout the 1980s and 1990s in the supply chains of companies
like Nike and IKEA, for example, and similar accusations continue to be made
against other large corporations. Lest we forget, humans are not alone in suffering
at the hands of big business, as demonstrated by BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill
3in 2010, which caused enormous destruction of marine life in the Gulf of Mexico.
Though it may be tempting to regard such events as the work of a few bad apples,
in fact, it seems more likely that they are indicative of a systemic problem—one that
requires a systemic solution.
1.1 A crisis of regulation?
Determining who is to blame for an event like the Rana Plaza collapse is critical
to answering the equally important question of what can be done. Of course, im-
proving local governance in less developed countries must be part of the solution.
That said, improving local governance takes time, especially in cases where both
corruption and the desire for economic growth and opportunity are high. A com-
plementary approach is to regulate the behavior of the multinational corporations
that are driving production. If the garment factories of Rana Plaza were forced to
either improve their workplace conditions or risk losing their contracts, the out-
come might have been different. The problem here is that not only is regulating
business difficult in a technical sense, due to the highly complex nature of the ac-
tions involved, it is also challenging politically, as it requires battling powerful
and entrenched special interest groups.1 Altogether, this begs the question, are we
witnessing a crisis of regulation, and if so, what is the way out?
This dissertation seeks to answer this question by examining the causes and
consequences of corporate social responsibility (CSR)—that is, the voluntary ef-
forts of business organizations to improve social and environmental performance
above legally defined minimum standards. Although non-state actors have been
working to regulate business through CSR for decades, political scientists remain
1Kettl (2005), for example, details how this kind of dissatisfaction with traditional command-
and-control-style regulation by the state has been a key driver of public management reform.
4largely skeptical of the efficacy of such programs. Why should companies choose
to self-regulate in any meaningful way, one could ask, given their profit motive?
This is an interesting question to investigate, but, as argued in the pages to follow,
not necessarily the right one, if our goal is to understand and prevent events like
Rana Plaza. Though we certainly want to know whether CSR has a direct impact
on corporate behavior, the research presented here indicates that the impact of CSR
on state regulation may actually be more meaningful. As we will see, many private
actors have used CSR, not to replace government, but to drag it into policy areas
that have been neglected or ignored.
1.1.1 Limits to government intervention
As mentioned above, the obstacles to effective government intervention in eco-
nomic markets are both technical and political. Any potential regulator of business
must have an understanding of how different goods and services are produced in
order to (1) determine where these production processes are likely to go wrong and
(2) propose and implement new rules that prevent them from doing so. Given this
information, these actors must also be willing to stand up to powerful special inter-
est groups that view new regulation as detrimental to their economic self-interest.
In the public sector especially both obstacles are formidable, with the result being
that policymakers are often unable or unwilling to impose additional regulatory
requirements upon business.
Although these problems are inherent to any business-government relation-
ship, they have been exacerbated over the past half century by the liberalization
and globalization of economic markets as well as the political mobilization of busi-
ness interests. A number of scholars have expressed concern over what they view
as the dismantling of the state through deregulation, privatization, and the im-
5plementation of other “neoliberal” policies beginning in the 1980s and continuing
through to the present (Kinderman 2012; Kaplan 2015; Jackson and Apostolakou
2010). This is demonstrated most vividly in the United States and the United King-
dom, where Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher reacted to the economic de-
cline of the late 1970s by re-orientating society away from government and toward
market institutions. Following the advice of conservative economists like Milton
Friedman, they sought to generate growth through the liberalization of markets:
privatizing state-owned enterprises, weakening labor unions, and reducing gov-
ernment spending and regulation. At the domestic level, this period coincided
with the organization of business as a political actor, in response the public inter-
est movement that had successfully lobbied for greater social and environmental
protection in the 1970s. It also coincided with continued efforts at the intergovern-
mental level to reduce tariffs and other barriers to international trade and invest-
ment.
It is important to note that the impact of these efforts has been overstated at
times. For example, scholars continue to debate the extent of welfare state re-
trenchment that has occurred in the advanced industrialized countries since the
1980s (Hacker 2004; Pierson 1996). At the same time, it is also noteworthy that the
arguments used in this period continue to appear in contemporary discourse (see
Schmidt and Thatcher 2013). Terms like “deregulation” and “privatization” are
still used to great effect by those who wish to shift the balance of power away from
states and toward private enterprise. On the opposing side of the argument, the
pejorative “neoliberal” moniker continues to serve as an important rallying point
for those who oppose these efforts.
Still, not everyone views “neoliberalism” in the same way. Braithwaite (2008),
for example, surveys these developments and places them in the broader context
6of large-scale shifts in state-society relations:
Those who believe we are in an era of neoliberalism—where this means
hollowing out of the state, privatization and deregulation—are mis-
taken. The transitions since feudal structures of governance fell to in-
cipient capitalist institutions have been from a police economy, to an
unregulable nineteenth-century liberal economy, . . . to the provider state
economy, to regulatory capitalism. [p. 26-27]
Whereas the state once was looked upon to provide social services (i.e. the “wel-
fare state”) and to manage industries critical to national interests, Braithwaite ar-
gues that these roles have since been contracted out, to varying degrees, to private
firms (see also Majone 1997). While this may be a cause for concern—for example,
if the quality and availability of services provided by private firms are less satis-
factory than those provided by states—it does not mean that the state no longer
plays an important role in the economy or in society.
In fact, the transition from public to private provision merely shifted the role of
the state from that of a provider to that of a regulator (Moran 2002). This new “reg-
ulatory state” aimed to control business not through direct ownership but through
the administration of new regulatory regimes enforced by government agencies.
That business interests often resisted such changes suggests that the state does, or
can, wield significant power in its authority as a regulator (Bardach and Kagan
1982; Smith 2000; Vogel 1978). Still, many observers remain skeptical of the state’s
ability to control business through regulation. Some argue that elected officials rely
on private firms to such a great extent—to provide jobs, to build new facilities, and
so on—that they simply cannot oppose them (Lindblom 1982). Others are wary
of government bureaucrats, who can easily become “captured” by the industries
7they are tasked with regulating (Carpenter and Moss 2013).
Adding to the alarm of some critics, regulation by nonstate actors has also been
on the rise during this period. This delegation of regulatory authority to the private
sector is viewed by some as a continuation of neoliberal policy reforms—that is, the
outsourcing of regulation itself (O’Rourke 2003). Although this label may apply
in some circumstances, other perspectives on private regulation fall outside the
scope of a neoliberal critique. For instance, Bu¨the (2010b) emphasizes a sharing
of regulatory authority between state and nonstate actors that is not necessarily
combative:
Private regulation may be defined narrowly as rule-making by non-
governmental actors. Private regulation in a broad sense entails pri-
vate actors playing a major role—at one or more stages beyond imple-
mentation or compliance—in what might be called the “regulatory pro-
cess” (Abbott and Snidal 2009) or the “governance sequence” (Bu¨the
2010a): agenda-setting, rule-making, implementation, monitoring, ad-
judication, and enforcement. [p. 1]
This perspective is also reflected in the concept of “regulatory capitalism” from
Levi-Faur (2005), which describes the shift toward to regulation as part of a new
political, social, and economic order in which both public and private actors play
a role. A prominent example is global or transnational regulation, such as in the
case of financial accounting, in which no single state has the authority to act (Bu¨the
and Mattli 2011). Here, the decision to delegate authority to a single private sector
or transgovernmental regulatory body is largely unavoidable (Drahos and Braith-
waite 2001). Another example is private regulation in policy domains where the
state is largely absent. In these cases, institutional entrepreneurs may use market-
8based private regulation to incentivize companies to self-regulate in areas not yet
covered by state regulation. Lacking coercive power, private regulators often ap-
peal to firms’ financial interests, offering excludable reputational benefits in ex-
change for self-regulation (Prakash and Potoski 2006; Cashore 2002).
1.1.2 The rise of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
For many observers, “corporate social responsibility”, or CSR, is a contradiction
in terms. Friedman himself ridiculed the concept, arguing that “there is one and
only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activ-
ities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game,
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud”
(Friedman 1962, p. 133). Going further, Friedman asserts that it would be a viola-
tion of their fiduciary duty for managers of listed companies to devote resources
to efforts that do not produce value for shareholders. Nevertheless, the number
of companies engaging in CSR continues to increase, especially among large listed
firms. How do we explain this?
Porter and Kramer (2011) provide a simple explanation: CSR is good for busi-
ness. While Friedman considered CSR to be a form of philanthropy, management
scholars like Porter and Kramer argue that these efforts, while philanthropic, can
also be directed in ways that create value for the firm—what they call strategic phi-
lanthropy. This may include community projects used to gain market access or
training programs used to generate pools of potential employees. The point, ac-
cording to this view, is to integrate CSR programs into the core functions of the
business. As a result, CSR should take on different forms depending on the firm.
For example, firms in the energy sector might focus more on environmental is-
sues, whereas firms operating in conflict areas might pay more attention to human
9rights. In either case, what results is beneficial both to the firm and to society at
large.
While the vision of such win-win scenarios is alluring, there is reason to take
caution. For one thing, studies trying to link corporate financial performance to
corporate non-financial performance have yielded mixed results (Margolis and
Walsh 2003). What is more, the “business case” for CSR, to the extent that it
exists, is more likely to produce value over medium- and long-term time hori-
zons, while many firms operate mostly to improve their short-term financial per-
formance. Thus, the “market for virtue” may not be as large as scholars like Porter
and Kramer make it out to be (Vogel 2005). At some point, firms are faced with the
decision of whether or not to fund CSR programs that will not improve short-term
profitability. If CSR cannot survive past this stage, which seems especially likely
for listed companies whose shareholders expect growth ever quarter, what good is
it?
The truth is that, in practice, firms that engage in CSR often do so under pres-
sure from, or through the guidance of, one or more civil society organizations.
Though some companies surely do believe that CSR gives them a competitive
advantage—think of a firm like Unilever, for example, that has separated itself
from its peers by integrating CSR into its brand identity—the trouble with under-
standing the rise of CSR solely in these terms is that it assumes most companies are
able to realize the potential of CSR on their own. In fact, many firms are persuaded
to engage in CSR by a host of organizations external to the firm: nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs), non-financial analysts, large institutional investors, and
even public authorities. While most thinking about CSR puts the firm at the center
of analysis, the firm is actually better understood as the target of other organiza-
tions that seek to push the CSR agenda forward.
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That CSR has not gone away is, on the one hand, a testament to the entrench-
ment of liberal values and policies around the world. CSR is a decidedly market-
oriented approach to improving social and environmental outcomes that is bol-
stered by neoliberal policies of privatization and deregulation (Kinderman 2012).
However, this market orientation is borne out of necessity, as it is the inability or
unwillingness of policymakers to address corporate wrongdoing that motivates
corporate watchdogs and other nonstate actors to intervene. Therefore, the contin-
ued rise of CSR over the past half-century, following Friedman’s famous rebuke, is
also a testament to the efforts of private regulators who have gone to great lengths
to name and shame companies who are perceived to have acted inappropriately.
The persistence of such groups presents a real threat to would-be corporate wrong-
doers, as they effectively put their own brand reputation on the line when they
disregard social and environmental norms. The more concerned companies be-
come about protecting their brand, the more CSR becomes a legitimate expense
for firms, even over short time horizons.
1.1.3 The link between CSR and public policy
Despite recent advances by Levi-Faur, Bu¨the, and others, the relationship between
private regulation and public policy remains undertheorized. Much of the existing
literature remains divided between those who view private regulation as an insti-
tutional mirror reflecting good governance (Campbell 2007; Gjølberg 2009; Midt-
tun, Gautesen and Gjølberg 2006) and those who see it as an institutional substitute
filling governance deficits (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Kinderman 2012).
Although this debate has garnered a great deal of attention from scholars, the
two sides of the argument do not necessarily run counter to one another. As Mat-
ten and Moon (2008) argue, many of the ideas and behaviors embodied in the
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concept of CSR have existed for many years, in many different contexts. In Anglo-
American countries, CSR developed as a market-driven approach that required
firms not only to behave responsibly but also to explicitly articulate their goals
and achievements to the public. In Continental European countries, firms faced
many of the same expectations in terms of behavior, but, without an overt mar-
ket orientation to CSR, these expectations were implicit. From this point of view,
the interesting change over time has been the expansion of “explicit” CSR into
systems where CSR was previously “implicit.” This may explain findings from
Gjølberg (2009), Campbell (2007), and others who show that firms based in the
Nordic countries actually perform much better compared to their peers, on aver-
age, when it comes to corporate social performance. These firms may be behaving
responsibly simply because they have been legally required or expected by soci-
ety to do so, and thus they perform well in CSR indices once these expectations
become explicit.
More to the point, as this line of research is primarily concerned with the in-
stitutional determinants of CSR, neither of these positions provide a clear indica-
tion of what effect the rise of private regulation may have on future public pol-
icy. Returning to the discussion of CSR above, it is important to first recognize
that CSR is not always understood in the context of regulation or public policy.
Thus, while CSR has been criticized as little more than “greenwash”—that is, a
public relations ploy to improve reputation without making substantive changes
to business practices—beneath the surface there has long been a tension between
the business-driven conception of CSR, which emphasizes voluntary engagement,
and the multi-stakeholder conception that points more in the direction of binding
rules (Brammer, Jackson and Matten 2012).
This tension has been on full display in the politics surrounding CSR in Eu-
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rope in recent years. As Fairbrass (2011) explains, policymakers have been di-
vided over whether private regulation should remain voluntary or morph into
state regulation. Kinderman (2013) argues that this ambiguity forces the European
Union (EU) to vacillate between the role of a “neo-liberal cheerleader” and that
of a “social-liberal standard-setter.” This is exemplified in how the EU has chosen
to define CSR in its own reports. In 2001, the European Commission defined CSR
as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in
their business operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a vol-
untary basis” (European Commission 2001).2 Ten years the later, the definition was
shortened to simply “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society,”
leaving the door open to interpretations of CSR that include the use of mandatory
rules (European Commission 2011).
Since much of the academic literature also does not address this ambiguity, this
dissertation aims to refocus the debate over CSR on the question of how voluntary
regulation impacts, and is impacted by, the development of new public policy. In
doing so, the project builds not only on the work of Levi-Faur (2005) and others,
who view CSR in the context of regulatory capitalism, but also on the work of
Eberlein et al. (2014), who focus attention on the interactions between different ac-
tors across time at different stages of the regulatory process—i.e. agenda-setting,
rule-making, implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and evaluation.
Figure 1.1 summarizes the causal chain theorized in this dissertation. Taking
the inability or unwillingness of policymakers to improve the social and environ-
mental performance of business as a starting point, we see that the causal chain
begins with the development of civil regulation. As discussed above, civil soci-










Figure 1.1: From private regulation to public policy. Solid lines with arrows signify
primary causal effects; feedback effects are denoted by dotted lines with arrows.
turned to the development of voluntary, market-based regulations. Their task, il-
lustrated by the solid line and arrow pointing to self-regulation, is to convince
firms that it is in their self-interest to comply with these regulations. It is these two
actions taken together—that is, civil regulation and self-regulation—that comprise
the field of CSR, or private regulation.3
Referring again to Figure 1.1, the three solid lines with arrows pointing to state
regulation represent the different ways in which CSR can impact the development
of public policy. First, civil society organizations may attempt to impact policy
directly, perhaps by offering their expertise or their work product, that is the reg-
ulations themselves, either as a resource or a demonstration of their own views
regarding the inadequacy of existing formal rules. Second, firms may attempt to
impact policy directly, and one can imagine very different scenarios in this case.
3It should be noted that the separation of civil regulation and self-regulation is significant and
intentional here, as it illustrates the voluntary nature of CSR. While some companies believe that
CSR has become voluntary in name only—that is, there is such a strong expectation that firms
will engage in CSR that they have virtually no choice but to comply—a distinction must still be
made between the pressure that civil society organizations can bring to bear on companies and the
coercive power of the state.
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Some firms, for example, may believe that by self-regulating they are sending a sig-
nal to policymakers that additional government intervention is unnecessary. Other
firms, who have already made costly investments in self-regulation, may instead
advocate for new mandatory rules, so as to force these costs onto their competi-
tors. Finally, there may be a cumulative effect of both civil regulation and self-
regulation, in which the message from civil society organizations to policymakers
is amplified by the number or type of firms that have agreed to self-regulate.
Finally, the dotted lines with arrows in Figure 1.1 represent the different feed-
back effects that may be observed in this regulatory system. First, the way in which
firms self-regulate is likely to impact the development of civil regulation. Lacking
the coercive powers of the state, civil society organizations must incentivize busi-
ness to exceed existing state regulatory requirements on a voluntary basis. If they
fail to convince a sufficient number of firms that self-regulation is in their best in-
terest, they may consider reducing the burden of their regulations to attract more
participants. Conversely, if civil society organizations succeed in getting a large
number of firms to self-regulate, they may consider ratcheting these standards up,
to increase their efficacy. The second set of feedback effects occur if and when there
is a change in public policy. Should policymakers decide to transform voluntary
civil regulation into mandatory state regulation, this will almost certainly produce
changes in private regulation. Civil society organizations are likely to respond by
developing new voluntary guidelines that push the regulatory space even further,
for the sake of their mission and their own institutional survival. Firms that were
once exceeding existing legal requirements may longer be doing so with the intro-
duction of formal rules, and they will have to decide whether to ratchet up their
own self-regulatory practices or be content with simply meeting existing state reg-
ulations.
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In sum, the relationship between CSR and public policy is multifaceted and yet
undertheorized in the existing literature. A good deal of scholarship has focused
on cross-national variation in CSR, examining in particular how state institutions
may promote, or fail to promote, responsible business conduct (Matten and Moon
2008; Brown and Knudsen 2015; Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Kinderman 2012;
Campbell 2007; Gjølberg 2009). This dissertation aims to redirect this debate in
two important ways. First, rather than focus primarily on the behavior of firms,
this project places special emphasis of the role of civil society organizations, which
appear to be the principal drivers of CSR. Second, instead of treating CSR as the
sole dependent variable, this project draws attention to what may in fact be the
most important contribution of CSR: its impact on public policy. To evaluate the
causal claims outlined above and in Figure 1.1, this dissertation looks in depth at
the relationships between civil regulation, self-regulation, and state regulation in
the case of corporate non-financial reporting.
1.2 The case of corporate non-financial reporting
Over the past decade, demand for information related to corporate social and en-
vironmental performance has increased dramatically across a wide range of stake-
holders, including investors, consumers, business partners, employees, communi-
ties and governments (Moon et al. 2012). From the stakeholder’s point of view,
corporate non-financial reporting (NFR) provides valuable information needed
to integrate social and environmental preferences into various decision-making
processes—for example, deciding which firms to invest in, work for, purchase
goods from, or do business with. From the firm’s point of view, such disclosures
bring with them the possibility of attracting new capital, better workers, and more
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business.
As demand for this kind of information has continued to rise from the late
1990s through to the present (Kolk 2008), so too has the demand for rules and
frameworks to (1) harmonize firms’ disclosure practices, so that information can
be compared across firms and over time; (2) monitor and enforce compliance with
quality assurance standards, so that disclosures are truthful and of material inter-
est to stakeholders; and (3) simply increase the number of firms reporting. The
development of these rules and frameworks has taken place largely within the pri-
vate and nonprofit sectors, and as a result NFR represents an interesting case study
in private regulation.
To return to our initial example, tragedies like Rana Plaza are, at least in part,
the result of information asymmetries. While local managers are often aware of the
dangers present in their factories, this information may not be shared with corpo-
rate managers elsewhere in the supply chain. Indeed, the use of subcontractors
makes it even more difficult for companies to determine how their own products
are being made. Even if this information is known to corporate managers, it is
rarely passed along to business partners, investors, or consumers. By being de-
nied this information, these individuals and organizations are then unable to act
on their own social and environmental preferences, whatever they may be.
Solving the problem of information asymmetry is no easy task. First, it may
not be clear what information is relevant to the transaction and therefore ought to
be disclosed. While a crack in the wall of a factory is obvious, in other situations
the task of identifying hazards requires guidance; one is unlikely to find problems
one is not looking for. Second, parties to a transaction have an incentive to inten-
tionally withhold information that may expose additional costs or risks. Therefore,
solving the problem requires establishing not only a set of rules governing what
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information should be disclosed but also an effective mechanism for monitoring
and enforcing compliance.
Despite these challenges, corporate non-financial reporting represents a poten-
tially fruitful complement to a global governance system that depends perhaps too
much on the motivations and abilities of public policymakers. Rather than hope
that policymakers have the desire and expertise needed to improve the social and
environmental performance of business, it may be safer to assume that individu-
als who also have these preferences would choose to act upon them in their daily
lives (i.e. as employees, consumers, business partners, and investors) if given the
opportunity—that is, if given the right information. That said, the issue should
not be framed in zero-sum terms. There remains a need for top-down, “command
and control” style regulation by the state. Indeed, as argued above and demon-
strated in the pages to follow, the lack of effective public policy is one of the most
important factors driving the development of CSR in the first place. The sharing
of corporate non-financial information across different stakeholder groups does
not relieve states of their responsibilities; it simply creates more opportunities for
individuals and organizations to participate in global governance by holding busi-
nesses accountable for their actions.
More to the point for current purposes, the case of NFR is striking also be-
cause it appears to upend conventional thinking about the relationship between
CSR and public policy. The idea that CSR could be a building block on the way
to new public policy is all but absent in the CSR literature, whether that be from
the perspective of management, law, or political science. And yet, as described
below, in the case of NFR we see that a rise in voluntary reporting in several Eu-
ropean countries has been followed by the enactment of new legislation making
these practices mandatory. This empirical relationship is a paradox according to
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the existing literature and therefore is worthy of investigation.4
1.2.1 Private regulation of NFR
This dissertation focuses on three organizations that have played a key role in the
private regulation of corporate non-financial reporting: the United Nations Global
Compact (GC), the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), and the Global Reporting Ini-
tiative (GRI). Although each organization differs in important ways, they all have
succeeded in stimulating demand for NFR, and they have transformed that de-
mand into new global norms. In fact, GRI, CDP, and GC are not simply the names
of organizations; they are also widely recognizable brand names that firms around
the world use to signify their commitment to CSR in general, and to corporate
non-financial reporting in particular. The success of these brands, demonstrated in
Figure 1.2, translates not only into resources for these organizations and a sense of
legitimacy for NFR, but it also speaks to the progress that has been made through
private regulation, particularly in regard to the agenda-setting and rule-making
stages of the regulatory process.
Although each deals with non-financial reporting, the GC, CDP, and GRI each
represent different approaches to solving the problem of information asymme-
try. The Global Compact, for instance, is a membership organization, in which
firms join by making an explicit commitment to uphold ten basic principles re-
lating to CSR. Membership comes with a mandatory annual disclosure require-
ment, forcing companies to detail their goals and their progress toward meeting
this commitment. In practice, this requirement is minimal, and thus the GC pro-
duces the largest number of non-financial disclosures of the three types analyzed
4Appendix A contains several excerpts from recent corporate non-financial reports as well as a
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Figure 1.2: Total number of corporate non-financial disclosures per year world-
wide.
here (see Figure 1.2). The Carbon Disclosure Project, in contrast, requests non-
financial information directly from companies via a detailed questionnaire. Al-
though this information is not made public, it is shared with a number of large
institutional investors that collaborate with the CDP. Finally, the Global Reporting
Initiative produces what is generally known to be the most comprehensive set of
non-financial reporting guidelines in existence. The guidelines are the product of
a multi-stakeholder process that brings together a variety of NGOs, firms, profes-
sional associations, academics, and other interested parties. Given the breadth and
depth of the GRI guidelines, firms tend to use them in piecemeal fashion, rather
than producing reports that meet each aspect.
Although this dissertation focuses largely on the GC, CDP, and GRI, these or-
ganizations are certainly not the only ones firms look to when deciding whether
or how to report on their non-financial performance. For example, the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, first adopted in 1976, contain informa-
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tion on non-financial reporting, as does ISO 26000, a relatively new corporate re-
sponsibility guidance established by the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO). The International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC), founded
in 2011, is also working on a framework that brings together both financial and
non-financial reporting. In addition, CDP is far from being the only organization
to request non-financial data from firms via the use of a questionnaire—other ex-
amples include the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (with the questionnaire sent
from their partner organization, SAM) and the FTSE4Good indices (through their
partner, EIRIS). Still, the GC, CDP, and GRI reporting standards remain among the
most popular, making these organizations influential players in the development
of corporate non-financial reporting rules and frameworks.
1.2.2 State regulation of NFR
As mentioned, the demand for more information on corporate non-financial per-
formance was followed almost immediately by a demand for rules and frame-
works to harmonize reporting practices and to improve the content and quality of
disclosures. Part of this demand was satisfied by private regulatory organizations,
such as the GC, CDP, and GRI. However, voluntary initiatives such as these, while
popular and influential, also come with a significant drawback—namely, the large
number of firms that decide not to participate. The roughly 6,000 firms worldwide
that have produced a GRI-based report at one time or another, for example, repre-
sent only 7.5% of the approximately 80,000 multinational corporations in existence.
Recent legislative developments in Europe appear to represent an attempt to
solve the problem of non-compliance and, in the process, they illustrate an inter-
esting trend pertaining to the phenomenon of corporate non-financial reporting:
the movement from private regulation to public policy. At the national level, sev-
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Figure 1.3: Map of mandatory and voluntary NFR in Europe in 2014. Darker colors
represent more non-financial reports per capita.
eral European states—including Denmark, France, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom—have begun to mandate non-financial reporting for certain types of
companies (see Figure 1.3). Although the precise requirements vary greatly from
case to case, the implementation of mandatory reporting requirements seems to
complement private regulatory standards by forcing companies who might not
22
otherwise report to begin doing so. Still, the question remains—to what extent is
this observed relationship between private regulation and public policy a causal
one?
1.3 Organization
The dissertation begins with the observation that the rise in voluntary corporate
non-financial reporting was followed in several European countries by the enact-
ment of new legislation making such practices mandatory (see Figure 1.3). Pos-
tulating a causal relationship between this increase in private regulation and the
introduction of new state regulation, the dissertation proceeds to test this claim
using a mixed-method research design.
Chapter 2 retraces the development of non-financial reporting regulation in Eu-
rope and the United States through a combination of in-depth interviews and anal-
ysis of publicly available documents. The purpose of the chapter is test hypotheses
regarding possible causal mechanisms linking the rise in private business regula-
tion to the development of new public policy. The analysis finds support for a three
stage process in which civil society organizations (1) expand the regulatory space by
developing new rules and frameworks in policy areas that state officials have been
either unwilling or unable to address; (2) change societal expectations for good corpo-
rate behavior by popularizing new forms of regulation; and (3) share responsibility
for NFR regulation with public policymakers through interlocking voluntary and
mandatory rules.
Chapter 3 introduces a new multilevel data set detailing the non-financial re-
porting practices of roughly 2,000 of Europe’s largest listed companies and uses
this data set to addresses the possibility of reverse causation by examining the de-
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terminants of firms’ NFR behavior. Contrary to the much of the existing literature,
which focuses on the role of institutional arrangements at the national-level, the
results here indicate that it is firm-level factors such as revenue and sector that
primarily drive the uptake of voluntary NFR regulation.
Chapter 4 begins by using network methods, in conjunction with the data set
introduced in Chapter 3, to measure the popularity of voluntary NFR across the
largest 15 member states of the European Union over the period, 2003-2014. This
measure is then used alongside other factors in a regression analysis examining
the development of NFR legislation at the country level. The results indicate that
the popularity of voluntary standards represent a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition for the development of new national-level public policy.
Chapter 5 examines the politics behind the European Union’s 2014 directive on
NFR, using public consultation data to examine the policy preferences of business,
nonprofit, and public sector organizations across Europe. As recent reports have
shown, the directive was the result of a lengthy and highly contested policymak-
ing process that played strongly on national interests—France, which had already
developed similar regulations at the national-level, lobbied in support of the direc-
tive, while Germany, which had not passed similar legislation, strongly opposed
it. This chapter validates recent accounts of the national divisions at play while
also revealing important divisions at the sectoral level that extend across national
borders. The results indicate that while business associations largely opposed the
directive, private regulation played a substantial role in establishing a broad base
of support for new EU policy, not just among nongovernmental organizations and
trade unions, but also among accountants, investors, and many individual compa-
nies.




CSR: Building block or stumbling block?
Abstract
Through a combination of in-depth interviews and analysis of pub-
licly available documents, this chapter retraces the development of non-
financial reporting (NFR) regulation in Europe and the United States.
The purpose of the chapter is to identify possible causal mechanisms
linking the rise in private business regulation to the introduction of
new public policy related to NFR. The analysis finds support for a three
stage process in which civil society organizations (1) expand the regu-
latory space by developing new rules and frameworks in policy areas
that state officials have been either unwilling or unable to address; (2)
change societal expectations for good corporate behavior by popularizing
new forms of regulation; and (3) share responsibility for NFR regulation
with public policymakers through interlocking voluntary and manda-
tory rules.
In the mid-1990s, very few companies publicly disclosed information related to
non-financial performance. Of those firms that did report on environmental, social,
and governance related issues, most did so voluntarily and in whatever manner
they deemed fit. Fast forward two decades, and we find a dramatically changed
landscape, with thousands of firms around the world reporting according to de-
tailed voluntary frameworks as well as, in an increasing number of cases, a range
of mandatory reporting requirements established by stock exchanges and public
authorities. Regardless of what one makes of corporate non-financial reporting
(NFR), it is unquestionably growing in popularity. What is more, a great deal of
regulation, both public and private, has been implemented in this area over a rela-
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tively short period of time.
As detailed in Chapter 1, one of the goals of this dissertation is to redirect de-
bate over CSR away from its institutional determinants and firm-level outcomes—
i.e., why firms engage in CSR and what they gain from it—and toward its impact
on public policy. In doing so, this project draws attention to the critical role that civil
society organizations play in driving the development of new regulation. The con-
current rise in both voluntary and mandatory NFR regulation that we observe in
many parts of the world may be paradoxical according to recent work in political
science that depicts voluntary programs as an alternative to, or safeguard against,
state regulation. Nevertheless, as demonstrated throughout this dissertation, the
correlation between private and state regulation in this area is an empirical fact
that should not be ignored. What is less certain is how these different forms of reg-
ulation relate to one another. Is CSR an obstacle to new public policy, as much of
the literature suggests? Or is CSR the thin end of the wedge—that is, a harbinger
of more regulation to come? Alternatively, is it public policy that ultimately drives
participation in private regulatory initiatives? Could both forms of regulation be
driven by some third factor, currently unaccounted for?
To answer these questions, this chapter retraces the development of corporate
non-financial reporting regulation, both public and private, in the United States
and Europe over the past two decades. The analysis focuses in particular on three
European cases—France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—in which we observe
both high levels of voluntary corporate non-financial reporting and legislation mak-
ing such practices mandatory for particular types of firms. Given the lack of re-
search in this area, the objective of the chapter is to develop a plausible theory
explaining the rise of both voluntary and mandatory NFR that can then be tested
in subsequent analyses.
27
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 briefly summarizes recent devel-
opments in NFR regulation in order to contextualize the research problem. Section
2.2 details the research methodology and data used in this chapter. Section 2.3
presents support for a three stage process in which civil society organizations (1)
expand the regulatory space by developing new rules and frameworks in policy ar-
eas that state officials have been either unwilling or unable to address; (2) change
societal expectations for good corporate behavior by popularizing new forms of reg-
ulation; and (3) share responsibility for NFR regulation with public policymakers
through interlocking voluntary and mandatory rules. Section 2.4 summarizes the
main findings and discusses subjects for future research in this area.
2.1 From private regulation to public policy
As described in Chapter 1, the private regulation of corporate non-financial report-
ing began in the late-1990s with the creation of voluntary standards by organiza-
tions like the United Nations Global Compact (GC), the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP), and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). This sudden rise in private regu-
lation was followed in subsequent years by the development of new mandatory
guidelines at the national and supranational level. Table 2.1 demonstrates the
cross-national variation we observe in both the number of firms that voluntarily
publish non-financial reports, using data from 2005, and the incidence of new state
regulation that makes NFR mandatory for certain types of firms. Looking at the
15 largest economies of the EU (ranked by GDP) and the United States, we see a
clear correlation between voluntary and mandatory forms of regulation. Meaning,
we tend not to find NFR legislation in countries that have a very small number of
firms participating in voluntary programs, such as Poland, while we do find NFR
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Reports per million capita (2005)
Country GC GRI CDP NFR Legislation
Austria 0.73 0.97 0.12 No
Belgium 0.38 0.29 0.57 No
Denmark 2.58 0.37 0.37 Yes (2008)
Finland 0.95 2.67 0.57 No
France 4.86 0.14 0.40 Yes (2001 & 2010)
Germany 0.52 0.22 0.22 No
Greece 0.36 0.36 0.00 No
Ireland 0.48 0.24 0.48 No
Italy 1.04 0.19 0.16 No
Netherlands 0.67 1.29 0.49 No
Poland 0.18 0.00 0.00 No
Portugal 1.62 0.48 0.10 No
Spain 5.06 1.35 0.16 Yes (2011)
Sweden 2.66 0.78 0.66 Yes (2007)
United Kingdom 0.81 0.33 0.63 Yes (2006)
United States 0.22 0.12 0.56 No
Mean 1.45 0.61 0.34
Table 2.1: Correlation between voluntary and mandatory corporate non-financial
reporting legislation. GC = United Nations Global Compact; CDP = Carbon Dis-
closure Project; GRI = Global Reporting Initiative.
legislation in countries like Sweden, where voluntary participation appears more
common. In the middle are a few countries, like Finland and the Netherlands, in
which no NFR legislation exists, despite moderate levels of participation in select
voluntary initiatives.
In addition to observing a correlation between voluntary and mandatory reg-
ulation, we also see that high rates of voluntary participation, relatively speaking,
appear to precede the development of NFR legislation in most cases. The outlier
here is France, which implemented its first mandatory reporting requirement at
about the same time when voluntary standards first appeared, around 2001. In the
remaining cases where we find NFR legislation—Denmark, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom—voluntary standards had already reached some degree of
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popularity by the time policymakers decided to implement mandatory rules.1
From a comparative standpoint, it is worth noting that while Table 2.1 pro-
vides further evidence for how CSR has flourished in Europe in recent years, Car-
roll (1999) makes clear that the origins of the concept actually lie in the United
States, beginning in the 1950s. Although this marks the beginning of what Matten
and Moon (2008) refer to as “explicit” CSR, by most accounts Europe has subse-
quently supplanted the USA as the world’s leader in CSR engagement. This is an
interesting trend, and one that appears to dovetail with the development of social
and environmental regulation by states. As Vogel (2012) observes, whereas the
USA had been the chief pioneer of protective state regulation from roughly 1960 to
1990, the locus of that kind of regulatory activity has since shifted to Europe. Thus,
it is perhaps unsurprising that we observe relatively low rates of participation in
voluntary NFR schemes as well as a lack of any meaningful NFR legislation in the
United States.
It is also important to recognize that while several countries in Europe have
implemented NFR legislation, the scope of these requirements varies considerably
across cases. As Table 2.2 illustrates, the reporting requirements established in
Spain and Sweden extend only to state-owned businesses, whereas those in France
and the United Kingdom apply to all listed companies. There is also a great deal of
variation in the reporting requirements themselves. While the UK’s requirement
gives firms the discretion to decide for themselves whether non-financial reporting
is required, France’s law—first passed in 2001 and then strengthened considerably
1While the number of reports published voluntarily per million capita is relatively small in the
case of the United Kingdom (in comparison to Denmark, Spain, and Sweden), this may be due in
part to a bias toward smaller countries in the per capita measurement. As discussed below, CSR is
primarily a phenomenon observed among large firms; per capita measurements are likely to favor
small countries that have a large number of large firms relative to their population size. In any case,
even with this potential form of bias, we still observe a relatively high number of firms reporting
according to the CDP standard in the UK.
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in 2010—requires firms to disclose information related to specific social and envi-
ronmental issue areas.
Table 2.2 demonstrates another trend, which is the regulation of NFR at the
level of the European Union. All EU member states had to transpose into na-
tional law a 2003 directive requiring firms to disclose non-financial information “if
it is necessary for an understanding of the company’s development, performance
or position.” Experts tend not to consider this requirement a case of mandatory
NFR legislation, simply because the requirement is vague and difficult to enforce
(KPMG et al. 2016). That said, the 2003 directive does indicate a certain level of
interest in NFR among EU policymakers, and it marks the beginning of a long de-
liberative process that eventually produced a new, much more stringent directive
in 2014.
2.2 Methods and data
This chapter is designed to probe the plausibility of the hypothesis that states with
a greater proportion of firms participating in voluntary NFR initiatives are more likely to
implement mandatory NFR regulation. As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the prior
work on CSR in political science has focused on explaining cross-national varia-
tion in CSR engagement among firms. To the extent that scholars have considered
the impact of CSR on public policy, the findings presented are often highly spec-
ulative as well as contradictory. For example, Vogel (2005) claims that CSR can
decrease or increase the likelihood of government regulation, depending on the
circumstances, though he does not elaborate how these processes might unfold.
Since cross-national studies typically link CSR adoption to the “varieties of capi-
talism” literature (Hall and Soskice 2001), it is possible that the impact of CSR on
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Country Year Description of regulation
Denmark 2008 Revision to Danish Financial Statements Act. Requires
large companies and state-owned enterprises to disclose
their CSR activities and use of environmental resources.
France 2001 New Economic Regulations (NRE), Article 116. Requires
listed companies to disclose data on 40 labor and social cri-
teria.
2010 Grenelle II, Article 225. Requires listed companies and
other large companies to produce a social and environmen-
tal report.
Spain 2011 Spanish Sustainable Economy Law. Requires government-
sponsored companies and state-owned businesses to file
annual corporate governance reports and sustainability re-
ports.
Sweden 2007 Guidelines for External Reporting by State-Owned Compa-
nies. Requires state-owned companies to produce an an-
nual sustainability report in accordance with GRI guide-
lines.
United Kingdom 2006 British Companies Act. Requires listed companies to dis-
close information on environmental, workplace, social, and
community matters that are material to their business.
European Union 2003 Amendment to Council Directives 78/660/EEC,
83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC requires
disclosure of non-financial information if it is necessary
for an understanding of the company’s development,
performance or position.
2014 Amendment to Council Directives 78/660/EEC and
83/349/EEC requires CSR disclosure in the annual report-
ing of large public-interest entities with more than 500 em-
ployees.
Table 2.2: State regulation of corporate non-financial reporting in the European
Union.
public policy varies according to the degree of market or non-market coordination
in a given regulatory environment. However, this hypothesis has yet to be tested
empirically. In sum, it is unclear the extent to which existing theory can help ex-
plain whether, how, or when private regulation might lead to the development of
new public policy.
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Given the need for theory development, as opposed to theory testing, this chap-
ter looks to identify possible causal mechanisms linking the rise in voluntary NFR
to the introduction of new NFR legislation through case study research. In particu-
lar, the chapter focuses on three European cases—France, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom—in which we observe both high levels of voluntary participation in pri-
vate NFR initiatives and the development of some kind of NFR legislation. This
search for causal mechanisms via case study research represents an deductive ap-
proach to theory development that makes sense here given the lack of prior work
in this area (George and Bennett 2005).
The selection of cases is also intended to capture the diversity of state regula-
tions governing corporate non-financial reporting observed among advanced in-
dustrialized societies (Gerring 2007). As shown in Table 2.2 and discussed above,
these regulations differ both in regard to (1) the number and type of firms affected,
e.g. state-owned companies, listed companies, or large companies and (2) the ex-
tent and type of reporting required, e.g. limited or extensive reporting based on
either a broad narrative format or key performance indicators. By treating state
regulation as the outcome variable and selecting cases that demonstrate the full
range of variation on this variable, this chapter proceeds to generate hypotheses
that can account for the development of NFR regulation across cases, while re-
maining open to idiosyncratic factors that may affect the process of public policy-
making within each case.
The approach to case study research taken here is not unlike the Bayesian ap-
proach to statistics. With Bayesian methods, a study begins with theoretical priors,
which the researcher then updates as appropriate in light of new evidence. As
Bennett (2008, p. 706) argues, the approach is similar with case studies, where
“it is not the number of pieces of evidence that matters but rather their probative
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value relative to alternative explanations.” In this way, process-tracing methods
are used to establish connections between possible causes and observed outcomes
in order to formulate theoretical expectations about how these kinds of events are
likely unfold in other cases. While some prior research suggests that private reg-
ulation hinders the development of state regulation—for example, by crowding
out support among key interest groups (e.g. Werner 2012; Kaplan 2015)—the high
correlation between voluntary and mandatory rules in the case of NFR suggests
that the opposite may be true. Thus, the chapter begins by positing a causal re-
lationship between these two forms of regulation, and then proceeds by seeking
evidence of causal mechanisms to probe the plausibility of this relationship rela-
tive to alternative explanations.
This chapter also borrows from the analytical framework developed by Eber-
lein et al. (2014) for the study of transnational business governance interactions.
This framework offers three main advantages. First, it focuses our attention on the
interactions between different actors involved in business governance, prompting
questions not only about which actors are involved and why, but also about how
individuals and organizations interact and the kinds of effects produced by dif-
ferent types of interactions. Second, it advises researchers to disaggregate the regu-
latory process, examining interactions at different stages, including agenda-setting,
rule-making, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. Finally, it focuses our
attention on how these interactions change over time.
The analysis draws on 31 on-site interviews with NFR managers in France,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as well as more than a dozen interviews with
various public and private sector organizations located in Brussels as well as other
locations throughout Europe and the United States. The full list of interviews con-
ducted is presented in Table B.1. Due to the sensitivity of the information discussed
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during these meetings, the identity of each each respondent is anonymized in the
text.
Company interviews were conducted with the manager directly responsible
for non-financial reporting. The interview questions focused on two broad top-
ics. First, managers were asked to detail the extent to which their company dis-
closes non-financial information and to explain the rationale for this decision. Sec-
ond, managers were asked to describe the process by which non-financial informa-
tion is collected and disseminated. Managers were also asked to provide a self-
assessment on the state of the company’s non-financial reporting practices as well
as their own views pertaining to the regulation of NFR. The full list of questions
asked in each company interview is provided in Table B.2. Most corporate NFR
managers were identified using the company’s website or non-financial report.
Where this was not possible, respondents were identified after a general inquiry
to the company. Most interviews were conducted in person at the corporate head-
quarters and lasted about an hour. As detailed in Appendix B, the interview sam-
ples consists of a mostly random selection of large, publicly traded companies with
headquarters in London, Paris, or Stockholm.
In addition to company interviews, numerous interviews were conducted with
government and multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, CSR
ratings agencies, trade unions, and business associations based in Europe and
the United States. This includes interviews with key figures working within the
United Nations Global Compact (based in New York), the Carbon Disclosure Project
(based in London), and the Global Reporting Initiative (based in Amsterdam).
While company interviews provided critical insight into how and why firms dis-
close non-financial information, these additional interviews provided both another
perspective on firm behavior while also shedding light on the strategies employed
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by other important actors in the NFR regulatory space. In both cases, the analysis
of interview data is supplemented with research based on publicly available doc-
uments, including public and private sector reports on NFR regulation, as well as
actual non-financial reports published by individual firms.
Based on this information, what follows is a comparative, qualitative analysis
of corporate non-financial reporting regulation that focuses in particular on the
relationship between private regulation and public policy in France, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom.
2.3 Three phases in the development of NFR regulation
In retracing the development of corporate non-financial reporting regulation in Eu-
rope and the United States over the past two decades, three distinct phases emerge.
The sequencing of these phases provides some initial empirical support for the hy-
pothesis that states with a greater proportion of firms participating in voluntary
NFR initiatives are more likely to implement mandatory NFR regulation.
As detailed below, the first phase consists of an expansion of the regulatory
space. Not satisfied with the quantity and quality of available information on the
non-financial performance of firms, or with the extent of government action in
this area, civil society organizations step in to produce a variety of voluntary stan-
dards by the end of the 1990s. In the second phase, running from roughly 2000
to 2007, perceptions of non-financial reporting begin to change, as new coalitions
gather behind these voluntary schemes and the number of companies participat-
ing rapidly increases. Finally, in the third phase, the growing popularity of these
new regulations, coupled with increasing levels of frustration over their imple-
mentation, reaches a tipping point, and public authorities begin to work in earnest
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with private regulators in order to develop complementary public policies. The
global financial crisis provides additional political impetus for new NFR legisla-
tion in this phase, ultimately resulting in additional mandatory rules at both the
national and supra-national level.
2.3.1 Expanding the regulatory space
In the United States, the 1970s was the high-water mark of command and control
regulation—the so-called “golden age” of social and environmental protection—in
which the state set and enforced specific targets for corporate performance through
new government agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Administration. The public interest movement that
gave rise to these political victories succeeded in part because it convinced much
of the public that they had a “right to know” what was happening inside corpo-
rations. Books like Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) opened the public’s eyes
to the unforseen impacts of business activity on society and the environment, fu-
eling demand for greater transparency and regulatory protection. Despite these
victories, however, the decade ended in political logjam, due to both the onset of
an economic downturn and the improved mobilization of business interests. Ac-
tivists then faced a dilemma—to continue push for reform within existing institu-
tions, knowing that it will be a difficult fight, or to pursue alternative strategies.
Not surprisingly, this contentious political climate encouraged many activists
to pursue their agenda outside formal political channels. Of course, changing the
behavior of large businesses without the use of coercive state regulation requires
would-be private regulators to have some kind of leverage over the firms they are
targeting. In the market-based economy of the United States, one of the key sources
of leverage has been control over investment capital. Although socially responsi-
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ble investing (SRI) had existed in some form throughout the country’s history—
driven mostly by religious groups that refused to invest in particular trades, like
gambling or the manufacture and sale of firearms—it took on renewed purpose
in the 1960s and 1970s. Whether it be in response to civil rights issues, gender
equality, or labor concerns, SRI showed how activists, empowered with informa-
tion, could attempt to pressure companies without the threat of state enforcement.
These efforts gained perhaps their highest degree of public attention in the 1980s
with the movement to divest from firms with dealings in South Africa, in hopes of
bringing an end to the Apartheid system.
Of course, SRI is not the only means of affecting corporate behavior without
the use of mandatory rules. A great deal of work was also underway during this
time period to establish voluntary codes of conduct for multinational firms. The
divestment movement aimed at the regime in South Africa, for instance, devel-
oped alongside the Sullivan principles, designed in 1977 as a set of social and hu-
man rights commitments to enhance corporate responsibility. The governments
of advanced industrialized societies were also involved in these developments,
most notably through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), which introduced its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in
1976. The OECD Guidelines, which continue to be updated periodically, provide
companies with a set of non-binding principles and standards for operating in the
global economy, addressing issues such as bribery, taxation, and sustainable de-
velopment.
The development of voluntary schemes pushed further ahead in the 1980s and
1990s, spurred on by a series of high-profile corporate disasters beginning with the
explosion of Union Carbide’s chemical plant in Bhopal, India that killed at least
3,000 people in 1984. Other events receiving significant public attention include
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the the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, the execution of Ken Saro-Wira and eight
other activists in 1995 following protests of Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta,
and the revelation of numerous violations of workers’ rights, including forced la-
bor and child labor, in Nike’s supply chain that first came to light in the late 1980s
and continued throughout the following decade. These events had a tremendous
impact on the development of civil regulation during this period, as activists be-
came less interested in compliance with state regulation and more interested in
pushing the boundaries of the regulatory space. By the end of the 1990s, a number
of new organizations and initiatives had emerged, including the Global Report-
ing Initiative in 1997, the United Nations Global Compact in 1999, and the Carbon
Disclosure Project in 2000.2 Although each initiative aimed to improve the non-
financial performance of business through market mechanisms, each had its own
unique point of departure that influenced its future trajectory in important ways.
Still, as voluntary initiatives, they shared a common challenge, which Bob Massie,
GRI’s co-founder, describes as being both “bold and visionary” and “practical and
incrementalist.”
The GRI originally formed in Boston through collaboration between the Coali-
tion for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) and the Tellus Institute
in 1997. It is a multi-stakeholder initiative designed to provide guidance on cor-
porate non-financial reporting to a variety of business and non-business organiza-
tions. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) joined the GRI as a
partnering institution a year after its founding, providing key administrative and
financial support as well as enhancing the organization’s legitimacy. Now head-
quartered in Amsterdam, the GRI has produced a comprehensive set of reporting
2Other prominent examples include the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices (DJSI), launched in
1999, and FTSE4Good, launched in 2001.
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standards known as the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. These guidelines,
currently in their fourth version (“G4”) since being introduced in 2000, have been
used by nearly 6,000 companies in 96 countries. Often considered the de facto
corporate non-financial reporting standard (Levy, Szejnwald Brown and de Jong
2010), the GRI Guidelines comprise a mixture of principles and Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) aimed at improving the content and quality of non-financial dis-
closure.
One of the key features of the GRI has been its large multi-stakeholder network
of supporters. At present, the GRI maintains a global network of more than 600
organizational stakeholders—a vast array of companies, NGOs, government agen-
cies, universities, and other organizations from over 60 countries—and more than
30,000 individual stakeholders from a variety of backgrounds. These stakehold-
ers provide critical financial support, but they also contribute to the development
of the guidelines through the GRI Stakeholder Council in Amsterdam. The GRI’s
global presence is further established through satellite offices (referred to as Focal
Points) in Australia, Brazil, China, India, and the United States.
The GRI’s position as the preeminent standard-setter for corporate non-financial
reporting is the product of both the strategy employed by its founders and the sup-
port it receives from constituent organizations. In its early stages of development,
the GRI’s founders built support for their organization and its novel approach to
disclosure by emphasizing the similarities between financial reporting and non-
financial reporting. Use of this analogy helped to legitimize non-financial report-
ing, particularly among business interests, and ease the transition to a new norma-
tive perspective. As development of the organization and its mission progressed,
however, this analogy became less useful and less relevant, as the dissimilarities
between financial and non-financial reporting became more apparent (Etzion and
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Ferraro 2010). While the GRI has been careful to manage the pace of this process
of institutionalization and thereby maintain the support it receives from its stake-
holders, this practice has also produced criticism that the GRI’s strategy reflects
the interests of its dominant constituencies—that is, large firms, financial institu-
tions, and international business management consultancies (Brown, de Jong and
Levy 2009)—and that it has thus failed to live up to its potential (Dingswerth and
Eichinger 2010).
While the GRI provides a variety of helpful resources for companies looking
to produce a non-financial report, some investors have criticized the GRI Guide-
lines for soliciting information that is of little material value. The Carbon Disclo-
sure Project (CDP), in contrast to GRI, formed solely with the needs of investors
in mind. Rather than encouraging companies to produce non-financial reports,
CDP requests the information it deems to be relevant directly from firms via a de-
tailed questionnaire that covers issues such as corporate greenhouse gas emissions,
energy use, and other activities related to climate change. CDP then relays this in-
formation to large institutional investors with whom it has partnered. Formed in
London, CDP now collects corporate environmental performance data from more
than 5,000 companies from around the world on behalf of more than 700 institu-
tional investors, who together hold a total of US$87 trillion in assets under man-
agement. However, while CDP has succeeded in achieving a high response rate
for its questionnaire, there is still concern that firms are not providing the kind of
information investors actually need (Kolk, Levy and Pinkse 2008). To address this
issue, CDP also oversees the development of new reporting guidelines through its
management of the Carbon Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) and the develop-
ment of its own Climate Change Reporting Framework.
While GRI and CDP have focused a great deal on the development of new non-
41
financial reporting metrics and processes, the time and resources required by firms
to comply with these voluntary standards are nontrivial. As a result, the kinds of
firms that either use the GRI Guidelines or respond to the CDP’s request for infor-
mation are typically large, listed firms. Not only do these firms have the resources
required for detailed non-financial disclosure, but they also have the kind of public
visibility that makes them vulnerable to corporate watchdog organizations. Thus,
many companies connected to either GRI or CDP already have some exposure to
non-financial reporting, and their participation is driven, at least in part, by the
desire to protect brand reputation.
In contrast to the detailed standards established by GRI and CDP, the United
Nations Global Compact (GC) is aimed at facilitating discussion around best prac-
tices, imposing only a modest reporting requirement on its members. As a result,
the GC is the single largest corporate responsibility initiative in the world. Firms
that choose to join the GC must produce a letter signed by their CEO that pledges
support for the GC’s ten basic principles of corporate responsibility—relating to
labor, human rights, the environment, anti-corruption, and other issues. Members
also must produce a report within two years of joining that details their progress in
living up to this pledge. Although the reporting requirement is much less onerous
than those used by GRI or CDP, the large number of GC members—currently more
than 8,000 active business participants in more than 140 countries—make it an sig-
nificant component of the corporate non-financial reporting landscape. In addi-
tion, the GC has also established a number of Local Networks to encourage firms
to collaborate and learn from each other. More recently, the GC began a new pro-
gram, Global Compact LEAD, which attempts to highlight the efforts of the best
performing and most active firms. Still, the GC has been criticized as a relatively
weak program with poor enforcement mechanisms (Berliner and Prakash 2012).
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As Knudsen (2011) has illustrated, while most members comply with the GC’s re-
porting requirement, a sizable portion do not, including many smaller companies
as well as companies from countries with poor domestic governance.
The introduction of new voluntary initiatives such as the GRI, CDP, and GC
marks both a change in corporate behavior and an expansion of the regulatory
space. Many of the firms that decided to participate in these programs in the early
2000s found themselves doing something they had not done before, i.e. collecting
and reporting information on non-financial performance, and they were basing
their decisions on rules and norms that were still in a nascent stage of develop-
ment. Though the social actors driving these changes were motivated at least in
part by the lack of effective public policy in this area, governments did play a sup-
porting role through organizations like the UN and OECD. At the same time, in-
terviews with the GRI and CDP reveal a strong desire to be viewed as independent
entities, free from the control of any government or intergovernmental organiza-
tion. In sum, civil society organizations such as these demonstrate an awareness of
the policy terrain that is consistent with the hypothesis put forward in this chapter.
They typically view themselves as pioneers in a new regulatory space, carefully
developing standards targeted at specific types of firms. As standard-setters, they
are not “neoliberals,” except in the sense that they are seeking to gain leverage
over firms through market mechanisms. Indeed, they are generally in favor of the
introduction of new government regulation at some point, though their expertise
in the policy area and their dissatisfaction with the current state of public policy
makes them wary of such developments.
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2.3.2 Changing expectations
The voluntary nature of private regulation presents a challenge for civil society or-
ganizations, as they must incentivize companies to commit to self-regulation while
also making sure that these regulations have enough bite to actually make a dif-
ference.3 Once organizations like the GRI, CDP, and GC succeed in gaining com-
panies’ support—for example, by building their own brand and offering exclusive
reputational benefits based on the value of that brand—they also need to be careful
not to move too fast too quickly. The process of developing private regulations is
therefore just as much about building coalitions as it about making rules. This is
particularly true in the case of multi-stakeholder initiatives like the GRI, in which
a variety of public and private organizations are encouraged to participate in the
regulatory process. Many of the firms interviewed for this project took advantage
of this opportunity to shape the development of corporate non-financial reporting
regulation, lobbying the GRI and other private regulators much as they would a
government agency.
In building coalitions behind new voluntary standards, private regulators must
persuade firms that self-regulation is in their own material best interest. As men-
tioned above, the strongest market mechanism to achieve this has been through
SRI and the proliferation of non-financial ratings, rankings, and analysis that the
SRI industry has produced. Nearly every firm interviewed identified investors
and non-financial analysts as a key audience for their disclosures. Much of this
is related to competition with peer firms, as companies are more likely to want
3These dynamics have been discussed at length by scholars of other voluntary initiatives, in-
cluding ISO 14001 (Prakash and Potoski 2006; Bansal and Hunter 2003), Fair Trade (Auld 2014; Bart-
ley et al. 2015; O’Rourke 2012), the Forest Stewardship Council (Auld 2014; Bartley 2003; Overde-
vest 2010; Cashore, Auld and Newsom 2004; Gulbrandsen 2010), the Marine Stewardship Council
(Auld 2014; Gulbrandsen 2010), and the Fair Labor Association (Locke 2013; Mosley 2011).
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to perform well in a given ranking system if their competitors are and appear to
be benefitting from it. While non-financial reporting managers often have a diffi-
cult time convincing upper-level management to commit substantial resources to
new compliance efforts, popular rankings—like the ones produced by CDP, DJSI,
and FTSE4Good—do get enough press coverage to occasionally catch the eye, and
interest, of a CEO. In other cases, managers seek out private standards as way
to survey the landscape of non-financial reporting and to anticipate the kinds of
issues that investors, business partners, and other stakeholders are likely to be in-
terested in. Alongside investors, current and prospective employees are also com-
mon targets for non-financial reporting, as many managers believe that CSR helps
to attract and retain talent within the firm.
In addition to bringing firms together with private standard setters and non-
financial analysts, NFR also leads many firms to seek partnerships with prominent
NGOs. Organizations like Transparency International and Swedwatch, for exam-
ple, frequently receive requests from firms to collaborate in some way, even if only
for a small blurb in a non-financial report. This puts NGOs in a difficult position,
and several interviews revealed a fear in these organizations of being captured by
powerful corporate interests. That said, many NGOs recognize the utility of corpo-
rate non-financial disclosure in their own public relations campaigns and are more
than willing to play along, albeit treading carefully.
Despite the argument, common among political scientists, that firms seek out
private regulation as way of keeping state regulation away, few reporting man-
agers discussed any such rationale. Some firms were anticipating additional gov-
ernment regulation in the near future and wanted to position themselves ahead of
the curve. Others, as will be discussed shortly, were reporting simply because they
were now required by law to do so. In most cases, however, government regula-
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tion did not factor into the decision-making process in any significant way. Many
of the firms interviewed were large, multinational corporations who were far more
concerned with appealing to investors, protecting their brand, and pursuing CSR
as means of establishing legitimacy and market access. The reporting practices of
these firms were often far in advance of any government regulation that existed or
was likely to be implemented in the foreseeable future.
As mentioned above, France is an outlier in this analysis, as the French govern-
ment was the first to implement mandatory corporate non-financial reporting re-
quirements and did so before private standards became popular. Article 116 of the
New Economic Regulations (NRE), passed in 2001, was limited in scope, requir-
ing listed companies to disclose information on a relatively small number of social
performance indicators. Nevertheless, it introduced the practice of non-financial
reporting to many of France’s largest companies and solidified a place for corpo-
rate transparency in the country’s sustainable development agenda. The law also
created an opportunity for France’s first corporate non-financial ratings agency, Vi-
geo (originally Are´se), to expand its operations. Since its founding in 1993, Vigeo
functioned as both a consultancy and a ratings agency, working closely with many
of the largest French firms to improve reporting practices, while also developing
an NFR assessment framework that became widely accepted and served as a ba-
sis for the NRE. For those companies who were not yet reporting in 2001, Vigeo
and other CSR consultancies provided experienced help in getting up to speed.
Though some companies perceived the NRE, and CSR more generally, as a way
to get companies to pay for programs that the government could no longer afford,
the more common view was that this legislation gave French companies the boost
they needed to take sustainability issues more seriously, ultimately giving them an
advantage over their peers from other countries. Not coincidentally, membership
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among French companies in various private regulatory initiatives surged in the
mid-2000s, particularly in the case of the Global Compact.
Elsewhere in Europe the climate for new state regulation on NFR was less
hospitable during the early 2000s. In the United Kingdom, the “CSR industry,”
as several managers referred to it, was thriving as a purely voluntary enterprise.
Whereas the culture in France promoted solidarity and a strong role for the state,
CSR in the UK focused more on experimentation and entrepreneurship. London
had become the center of the CSR industry in many ways, home to a vast array of
NGOs, consultancies, accountancies, investors, and other organizations. In turn,
British companies often considered themselves to be among the most progressive
and innovative in the world when it came to corporate non-financial reporting.
Although many of the social actors involved believed that CSR was helping to
fill governance gaps left behind by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, this all took
place alongside the common perception that CSR was largely a private sector phe-
nomenon that should remain voluntary. However, while the UK had certainly
gained a reputation for its laissez-faire approach to regulation, it was also becom-
ing evident at this time that many organizations would benefit from some kind
of mandatory reporting legislation. As in France, the UK had a large number of
companies that could get ahead of the curve by improving their NFR practices, as
well as a number of supporting industries set up to help them do so. Still, as the
CSR agenda began to shift from a wholly voluntary approach to a mix of private
and public regulation in the mid-2000s, policymakers in the UK found themselves
reluctant to follow France’s lead.
Nevertheless, by 2003 policymakers in the UK had begun working on manda-
tory NFR legislation. The proposed requirement, referred to as the Operating and
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Financial Review (OFR), was announced in July of that year.4 The OFR was a com-
prehensive regulation, intended to serve as a vehicle for corporate social and en-
vironmental reporting in the UK.5 A draft of the OFR was published in May 2004,
and it slowly received support among the business community as companies pre-
pared for compliance. However, in November 2005, Gordon Brown—then Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer—made a surprising decision and announced the govern-
ment’s intention to abandon the OFR in favor of a more limited, narrative reporting
requirement, which the government adopted in 2006. Though Brown claimed to
base his decision on the fact that the OFR would have exceeded requirements of the
2003 EU accounting amendments, many observers viewed it as a blatant attempt
to appear pro-business.6 Thus, even with a center-left government and a broad
base of support, the political climate in this case was still not favorable enough for
policymakers to feel safe pursuing new regulation.
Following France’s adoption of the NRE in 2001, several Nordic countries also
began working on their own version of mandatory NFR legislation, though again
the results reflected the region’s unique perspective on CSR. While policymakers
here may not have faced the same internal pressures—i.e. France’s penchant for
business regulation or the UK’s extensive CSR industry—they recognized that cor-
porate non-financial reporting was an important issue that could provide a com-
parative advantage for their companies, particularly those in export sectors. Still,
in Sweden, the idea of taking credit for good corporate social and environmen-
tal performance through disclosure rubbed against the prevailing norms of Nordic
4British Department of Trade and Industry, “The Operating and Financial Review: Practical
Guidance for Directors,” May 2004.
5The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, “The Operating and Financial Review: A
Catalyst for Improved Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure?,” Research Report No. 89,
2005.
6Accounting Standards Board, “Reporting Statement: Operating and Financial Review,” Jan-
uary 2006.
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culture. To many, corporate non-financial reporting was embedded in a CSR move-
ment that was essentially Anglo-Saxon in origin and at odds with the European so-
cial model. Thus, while Swedish companies were slowly gaining interest in the va-
riety of private regulatory schemes available, there was limited demand for a com-
prehensive reporting requirement. Rather than seek new regulation that would
apply broadly to Sweden’s largest companies, the Swedish government opted to
mandate non-financial reporting for state-owned companies only.7 This new law,
passed in November 2007, required all companies in which the government has an
ownership stake—including 40 companies wholly owned by the government and
15 partially owned companies—to produce a non-financial report in accordance
with the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. The specific reference to GRI is
noteworthy, as it represents an official endorsement and a signal to other Swedish
companies that they should begin reporting on non-financial performance if they
are not already.8 In this way, the Swedish requirement represents an interesting
mix of hard and soft law.
At the same time that Sweden was working on new reporting requirements for
state-owned companies, Denmark was working on its own, far more ambitious
legislation. Passed in 2008, Denmark’s comprehensive reporting requirement re-
quired all large companies and state-owed companies to disclose non-financial in-
formation. Although most of these companies did not fulfill the requirement in the
first year, by 2013 more than 95 percent of large companies in Denmark produced a
non-financial report in compliance with the law.9 In the opinion of at least one pri-
7Swedish Ministry of Finance, “Guidelines for external reporting by state-owned companies,”
November 2007.
8Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications, “Increasing Responsibility
Through Transparency: A study of the consequences of new guidelines for sustainability reporting
by Swedish state-owned companies,”
9Danish Business Authority, Corporate Social Responsibility and Reporting in Denmark: Impact
of the third year subject to the legal requirements for reporting on CSR in the Danish Financial
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vate regulator interviewed for this project, Denmark’s legislation would not have
been possible without having a “critical mass” of Danish firms already reporting
on a voluntary basis. While that is an interesting observation, and one that sup-
ports the hypothesis presented here, it is worth noting that Denmark and Sweden
chose different paths in terms of state regulation despite having similar rates of
participation in voluntary schemes like the GRI, CDP, and GC.
In the United States, no comprehensive NFR legislation was proposed during
this period. In the view of one CSR manager, who had worked on both sides of
the Atlantic, there appeared to be much less interest in NFR generally in the USA
compared to Europe. While elements of the CSR movement have made it onto
the legislative agenda, unlike in France, the United States federal government has
never formed a comprehensive strategy or position on these issues, tackling them
instead on an ad hoc basis through the uncoordinated activities of different agen-
cies.10 While many American companies participate in voluntary NFR initiatives,
in proportion to the size of the economy or population, the number is much smaller
when compared to France, Sweden, or the UK. Thus, while there is a CSR indus-
try in the United States, with organizations like Business for Social Responsibility
(BSR) taking on a role similar to that of Vigeo in France or Business in the Commu-
nity (BITC) in the UK, the coalition of NFR supporters is smaller and less influen-
tial politically. And, as in the UK, business regulation has remained a contentious
political issue in the United States. The differences between the case studies de-
scribed here are illustrated in Table 2.4.
Statements Act,”, March 2013.
10United States Government Accountability Office, “Numerous Federal Activities Complement























































































































































































































































































































































































































The development of NFR regulation experienced a significant turning point fol-
lowing the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. First, the crisis provided a clear test
of the claim, commonly made by critics, that CSR was an extraneous activity for
firms that would quickly be abandoned during economic downturns. Judging by
the continued rise in voluntary corporate non-financial reporting during this time,
this simply did not happen at the aggregate level. If anything, it appears that inter-
est in CSR continued to grow following the crisis, as companies sought to convince
a wary public of their commitment to social and environmental issues. Second, by
creating a perception that policymakers had failed to adequately protect the pub-
lic through regulation, the crisis raised the likelihood of new state regulation in a
range of policy areas. Elected officials were no less eager than many large compa-
nies to demonstrate to the public that they were not the villains some were making
them out to be.
This environment bolstered trends in the regulation of NFR that were already
well underway. By 2008, private regulatory organizations had been developing
voluntary NFR standards, and building coalitions in support of these standards,
for nearly a decade. Similarly, several national governments had made NFR manda-
tory in some way for at least some firms. Still, while it appeared that both volun-
tary and mandatory rules in this area would continue to develop going forward,
it was not clear at this time how these various regulations would interact with one
another. Put another way, while the idea of NFR had been created and popular-
ized, many questions remained about how it was actually going to work in terms
of implementation.
The most common frustrations with NFR over its brief history up until this
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point had to do with the quantity and quality of reports available. While organiza-
tions like the GRI, CDP, and GC had succeeded in developing new NFR standards,
even by the end of the 2000s relatively few companies were using them. Despite
rapid growth in the uptake of these voluntary standards, the roughly 6,000 firms
that had produced a GRI-based report still represented only 7.5% of the world’s
80,000 multinational corporations. This is to say nothing of the enormous varia-
tion observed in both the materiality and veracity of the information disclosed by
those companies that did report. For those who believed in NFR and wanted to
see it deliver on its promise, these became critical challenges to address.
While many in the business community continued to believe firmly that NFR
should remain voluntary, elsewhere there was a growing sense that the coercive
power of the state made it well suited to the task of raising the total number of
companies reporting. This view played a particularly important role in the devel-
opment mandatory NFR legislation in the European Union. Just as France was
ratcheting up its own NFR standards through the Grenelle II regulations in 2010,
Michel Barnier took over as EU Commissioner for Internal Market and Services.
This marked a shift in the EU’s view of CSR, which up until that point had empha-
sized its voluntary nature. Through a series of discussions, addressed in more de-
tail in Chapter 5, EU policymakers developed a new directive on NFR that aimed to
drastically increase NFR participation by requiring large, listed companies across
the EU to report non-financial information.
Though the state may have greater competence vis-a`-vis private regulators in
enforcing compliance, it is not clear that it holds the same advantage when it comes
to the task of harmonizing standards. Though France’s Grenelle II requirement
was far more detailed than its predecessor, the NRE, most large companies were
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already doing far more than what was required by the time it came into force.11
In the EU’s directive, however, policymakers did not follow this kind of prescrip-
tive approach; instead they largely left the decision up to companies as to what
exactly should be disclosed to the public, making specific reference to the choice of
voluntary standards available, such as GRI.
The fact that public policymakers were relying so explicitly upon private regu-
lation created pressure for private regulatory organizations to work together. This
did not come naturally in some cases, as these organizations often developed on
quite different trajectories and with little direct contact with one another. Nev-
ertheless, the early 2010s witnessed a wave of new collaborations between these
organizations, beginning with a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between
the GRI and GC in 2010 and continuing with a similar MoU between the GRI and
CDP in 2013. By working together to harmonize standards, these organizations
helped to clarify the NFR regulatory space for both companies and governments.
At the same time, though private regulators were interested in harmonization,
each had its own group of constituents to please. For the GRI, the task of satisfying
both its diverse group of organizational stakeholders and the large list of firms ad-
hering to its reporting standards was becoming increasingly difficult in the early
2010s. Early drafts of G4, its newest iteration of the GRI Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines, received a negative reaction at several of the companies interviewed
for this project. One manager dismissed it as a “wish list for NGOs,” while an-
other claimed that it “could undermine the existence of the [GRI].” That said, the
GRI is certainly not alone in having this kind of problem. In general, while private
regulatory organizations have succeeded in getting a relatively large number of
11French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing, “Le Grenelle
Environnement,” December 2010.
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companies to report on non-financial performance, they have also run into limi-
tations that are in some sense inherent to voluntary self-regulation. Though they
want to push the boundaries of the space, if they ratchet up existing standards too
quickly, they risk alienating their base of supporters.
Though NFR regulation continues to evolve, what we observed in the period
following the global financial crisis suggests that public policymakers and private
regulators have begun to settle into different roles as they share responsibility in
this new policy domain. The existence of several overlapping voluntary standards
has created a laboratory for developing ideas as to what NFR can and should be.
This is particularly helpful in the earlier stages of the regulatory process, partic-
ularly in regard to agenda-setting and rule-making. On the other hand, private
regulators have struggled to take NFR mainstream. Here, mandatory rules en-
forced by the state can have the most impact, leading to a larger role for public
policymakers in regard to implementation, monitoring, and compliance. Though
time will tell, this may be an enduring division of labor, as private regulators keep
pushing the ceiling of the regulatory space, while public policymakers raise the
floor.
2.4 Discussion
Though this analysis cannot validate the hypothesis that states with a greater pro-
portion of firms participating in voluntary NFR initiatives are more likely to implement
mandatory NFR regulation, it does establish a certain degree of plausibility for the
claim. One way to evaluate the utility of this kind of plausibility probe is to de-
termine the extent to which we see evidence of what we would expect to observe
if the hypothesis were true. This chapter finds evidence for a three stage process
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in which private regulation can lead to the development of public policy. As de-
scribed above, the first stage consists of a expansion of the regulatory space, in
which private regulators take on issues that the state had been either unable or un-
willing to address. In the second stage, these organizations find themselves acting
not only as private standard setters but also as key members of broad coalitions
that include a variety of social actors, including NGOs, professional organizations,
intergovernmental organizations, accountancies, consultancies, and many high-
profile corporations. These coalitions provide the political cover necessary for pol-
icymakers to take on the issue themselves, leading directly into the third stage, in
which public and private actors carve out complementary roles for themselves in
this emergent policy area.
This analysis also points to several potentially fruitful avenues for future re-
search. First, as argued in Chapter 1, it suggests that CSR scholarship has perhaps
overlooked the critical role played by civil society organizations by focusing so
heavily on the behavior of firms. While publicly the focus of private NFR reg-
ulation is often on improving the social and environmental performance of firms,
interviews with private regulatory organizations revealed, at a minimum, an acute
awareness of their impact on policymakers and, in some cases, a explicit strategy
to bring the state into the NFR regulatory space. Looked at this way, the choice
of NFR, as opposed to some other aspect of the CSR agenda, becomes more obvi-
ous. While NFR encourages firms to develop CSR efforts in particular directions,
it leaves the voluntary nature of CSR intact. This is politically expedient from
the regulator’s point of view, since (1) business is often opposed to new regula-
tion and (2) initiatives aimed at transparency rather than specific programs require
fewer resources to design and implement. Since non-financial disclosure is typi-
cally understood as a subset of the accounting profession—not known for grabbing
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headlines—it is also likely to remain a low salience issue, as opposed to the kind of
broad sweeping command-and-control regulation with which the general public
is more familiar (e.g. Clean Air Act). Contrary to what Culpepper (2011) has ar-
gued, this actually played to the advantage of private regulators that benefit from
private dealings with business, in which firms feel more open and willing to adopt
new regulations voluntarily. Also, by giving firms the opportunity to pursue goals
that make the most sense for them, private regulatory organizations were able to
develop more dynamic forms of regulation than might otherwise have been possi-
ble.
This analysis also points to another interesting theme, which is coordination be-
tween public and private actors in the absence of well-defined partnerships. The
surge in NFR regulation from 2000 to the present can be attributed to the many
ways in which pubic and private regulators have coordinated, explicitly or implic-
itly, to raise regulatory standards for business. While the mix of public and private
regulation that we now observe in the field of NFR is paradoxical according to
recent work in political science, what we see is that, at a time of limited govern-
ment resources and a lack of political will for new regulation, voluntary programs
have served as an effective circumvention of bureaucratic deficiency and legisla-
tive deadlock. That said, while voluntary programs succeeded in legitimizing the
idea of NFR, along with new sets of rules and principles, these programs ultimately
failed to deliver the kind of comprehensive regulatory system, complete with mon-
itoring and enforcement mechanisms, that many end-users had come to expect or
demand. This created a kind of tipping point, in which government regulation be-
came much more likely—a dynamic that was exacerbated by the aftermath of the
global financial crisis.
It should be noted, however, that while there appear to be mechanisms linking
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CSR and public policy in a general sense, variation across the selection of cases in
this analysis indicates that the precise effect of private regulation on public policy
is likely mediated by several key variables at the national level. Aside from the
strength of the NFR coalition in a particular country, we see important differences
in national culture, institutions, and overall regulatory environment. For exam-
ple, as Midttun et al. (2015) have noted, there is a conflict between CSR, largely
perceived as an Anglo-Saxon concept, and Nordic corporatist traditions. Though
Nordic governments may want to position firms located in their country to com-
pete successfully on the CSR dimension, this lack of institutional fit makes it more
difficult to implement the kind of sweeping state regulation observed in France,
for example. Similarly, in cases like the United Kingdom where policymakers feel
political pressure to appear business-friendly, new state regulation is less likely,
even if the NFR coalition is strong.
In sum, the evidence presented here indicates that the growth of private regu-
lation is likely to have played an important role in the development of NFR regu-
lation that we have observed at the national and EU level over the past decade or
more.
Chapter 3
Why do firms engage in CSR?
Abstract
This chapter examines the corporate non-financial reporting practices
of Europe’s largest listed companies. This includes 2,043 firms in the
largest 15 member states of the European Union over the period, 2003-
2014. Contrary to the much of the existing literature, which focuses on
the role of institutional arrangements at the national-level, the results
here indicate that it is firm-level factors such as revenue and indus-
trial sector that primarily drive the uptake of voluntary NFR regulation
in the EU. The implication is that leading CSR countries, like France
and the United Kingdom, are noteworthy, not for any particular public
policy (or lack thereof) that encourages CSR, but for the particular con-
stellation of firms headquartered there, namely the high percentage of
large, listed firms from industries that are most likely to receive pres-
sure from social and environmental activists.
What leads some companies to begin reporting on non-financial performance, and
why do so many others remain on the sidelines? As mentioned earlier, much of
the literature on this subject is divided between those who view CSR as an institu-
tional mirror reflecting good governance (Campbell 2007; Gjølberg 2009; Midttun,
Gautesen and Gjølberg 2006) and those who see it as an institutional substitute
filling governance deficits (Jackson and Apostolakou 2010; Kinderman 2012). The
purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, the chapter seeks to contribute to the mir-
ror/substitute debate by demonstrating the importance of firm-level factors, such
as firm size and industry, which are far more influential on NFR behavior than the
country in which the firm is headquartered. Second, the chapter aims to provide
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additional empirical support for the hypothesis that states with a greater proportion
of firms participating in voluntary NFR initiatives are more likely to implement manda-
tory NFR regulation by addressing the possibility of reverse causality—that is, that
changes in public policy created a spike in the uptake of NFR private regulation,
and not the other way around.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 briefly summarizes the literature
on the institutional determinants of CSR, demonstrating the weakness of previous
studies in generating and testing firm-level, as opposed to national-level, theories.
Section 3.2 introduces an original multilevel data set used both here and in Chapter
4. This data set details the non-financial reporting practices of approximately 2,000
large, listed firms in the 15 largest EU economies over the period, 2003-2014. Sec-
tion 3.3 analyzes the determinants of these NFR practices using multilevel models,
demonstrating the importance of firm-level variables, such as firm size and sector.
Section 3.4 concludes the chapter with suggestions for future research in this area.
3.1 Global forces or national legacies?
As described above, much of the existing work examining the question of CSR en-
gagement focuses on the role of national-level institutions. Campbell (2007), in a
theoretical contribution supported empirically by Midttun, Gautesen and Gjølberg
(2006), argues that firms are more likely to engage in CSR in environments with
greater public and private regulation, civil society organizations to monitor cor-
porate behavior, and institutionalized norms and procedures for holding corpo-
rations accountable. Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) also focus on national-level
institutions, though they arrive at the opposite conclusion, arguing that it is liberal
(not coordinated) market economies that are most likely to score well on measures
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of CSR engagement.
Although these studies are well-grounded theoretically in the varieties of cap-
italism literature, they leave behind a range of explanations that exist at the firm-
level. This is acknowledged by Aguilera, Rupp and Ganapathi (2007), who make
an important contribution by developing a multilevel theory for CSR engagement
that encompasses individual-, organizational-, national-, and transnational-level
factors. Still, where firm-level explanations are proposed, they are rarely empiri-
cally tested alongside potentially competing national-level explanations. Gjølberg
(2009), for example, presents two hypotheses for why companies engage in CSR:
(1) a “globalist” hypothesis that suggests such behavior is the product of pressures
deriving from global markets and (2) a “institutionalist” hypothesis that traces CSR
back to the political-economic system in which a firm operates. Although Gjølberg
finds support for both claims based on an examination of 19 countries, her analysis
is problematic, as it uses data aggregated to the country-level to test a hypothe-
sis (i.e. the globalist hypothesis) that is best conceptualized and measured at the
firm level. Other quantitative studies in this area fall prey to the same shortcom-
ing (e.g. Berliner and Prakash 2012; Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Perkins and
Neumayer 2010).
Based on the fieldwork described in Chapter 2, it seems unlikely that CSR en-
gagement is driven simply, or mostly, by institutional factors at the national level.
When asked why they produce a non-financial report, many managers referenced
the pressure they receive from investors, analysts, and nongovernmental organi-
zations, many of which operate at a transnational level. Others mentioned their
desire to appeal to current and prospective employees. What is more, apart from
references to specific legal requirements, these responses did not appear to corre-
late with the country in which the firm was headquartered. While other studies
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have also found market forces to be a more influential determinant of CSR engage-
ment than state institutions (Brown and Knudsen 2015), this area has not yet been
subjected to rigorous empirical analysis in a way that provides a fair test of both
firm-level and national-level claims.
3.2 Methods and data
This chapter introduces a new multilevel data set detailing the non-financial re-
porting practices of roughly 2,000 of Europe’s largest listed companies and uses
this data set to examine the determinants of firms’ NFR behavior. As described
below, the data set consists of both firm-level and country-level variables that are
needed to test hypotheses at both levels of analysis.
3.2.1 Firm-level data
The first step in generating the data set was to gather data on firms’ corporate
non-financial reporting practices. As discussed in Chapter 2, firms disclose non-
financial information in various ways. This includes standalone CSR reports as
well as integrated reports that combine financial and non-financial information. It
also includes responses to questionnaires asking about social and environmental
performance. Consistent with the preceding analysis, the data set presented here
includes measurements from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), United Nations
Global Compact (GC), and Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). In the analysis to fol-
low, GRI report is a binary variable indicating whether or not a firm has produced a
non-financial report in a given year that references the GRI’s Sustainability Report-
ing Guidelines.1 GC member indicates whether or not a firm is an active member
1Data obtained directly from the GRI in March 2016.
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of the United Nations Global Compact.2 CDP response indicates whether or not
a firm has responded to the Carbon Disclosure Project’s questionnaire on climate
change.3
Data on firms’ NFR practices was then matched with financial data from the
Compustat Global database (Compustat 2016). Revenue (ln) refers a firm’s total
revenue, converted to USD and transformed by the natural logarithm. Profit margin
(pct) indicates a firm’s gross profit margin percentage, calculated according to the
following formula:
Profit margin (pct) =
Revenue− Total cost of goods
Revenue
× 100 (3.1)
Sector refers to a firm’s industrial sector according to the Global Industry Classi-
fication Standard, which includes the following categories: energy, materials, in-
dustrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, financials, infor-
mational technology, telecommunication services, and utilities.4
Data coverage begins in 2003, the first year in which the GRI, GC, and CDP are
all in operation, and ends in 2014, the last year for which we have reliable data
on all three NFR practices.5 To create balanced panels, important for subsequent
analyses (see Chapter 4), only firms observed over the entire period, 2003-2014
are kept in the data set. Finally, since NFR regulation is aimed primarily at large
companies, only firms with $50 million USD in total revenue or more, in at least
one year of the time series, remain in the data set. Firms that were listed in the
2Data obtained directly from the GC in February 2016.
3Data obtained directly from the CDP in March 2016.
4More detailed information on coding and data sources for both firm-level and country-level
variables can be found in Table C.1.
5The GRI, in particular, is slow to record the number of firms using its guidelines each year. As
a result, recent figures are often revised upwards as time goes on. For this reason, data from 2015,
obtained in early-2016, were deemed to be incomplete and therefore was discarded.
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Table 3.1: Number of firms by industry
GICS Sector N Percent Examples
10: Energy 54 2.64 Royal Dutch Shell; BP; Total
15: Materials 163 7.98 BASF; BHP Billiton; Rio Tinto
20: Industrials 504 24.67 Siemens; Airbus; Maersk
25: Consumer Discretionary 376 18.40 Volkswagen; Fiat Chrysler
30: Consumer Staples 142 6.95 Carrefour; Tesco; Unilever
35: Health Care 101 4.94 Bayer; GlaxoSmithKline; Sanofi
40: Financials 361 17.67 AXA; HSBC; Banco Santander
45: Information Technology 261 12.78 Nokia; Ericsson; SAP
50: Telecommunication Services 30 1.47 Telefonica; Orange; BT
55: Utilities 51 2.50 Enel; EDF; National Grid
Total 2043 100
databases of GRI, GC, or CDP but not included by Compustat—mostly privately
owned companies—were also discarded from the data set. Thus, the result is a
data set detailing the non-financial reporting practices and background financial
information of Europe’s largest, listed firms. Table 3.1 breaks down the list of firms
included by industry, providing examples from each category. Telecommunication
Services, Utilities, and Energy are the least represented sectors, with 1.47%, 2.50%,
and 2.64% of firms, respectively. Financials, Consumer Discretionary, and Indus-
trials are the most represented sectors, with 17.67%, 18.40%, and 24.67% of firms,
respectively.
3.2.2 Country-level data
Having formed a firm-level data set, the next step was to add a number of country-
level factors that have also been hypothesized to influence firms’ CSR engagement.
Measures of the size of the economy, the level of development, and the rate of
economic growth in each country—GDP (ln), GDP per capita (ln), and GDP growth,
respectively—are taken from the World Development Indicators database (World
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Table 3.2: Number of firms by country
Country N Percent Examples
Austria 49 2.40 OMV; Erste Group Bank; Voestalpine
Belgium 71 3.48 Ageas; Dexia; Anheuser-Busch InBev
Denmark 86 4.21 Maersk; Danske Bank; Novo Nordisk
Finland 88 4.31 Nokia; Stora Enso; Kesko
France 321 15.71 Total; AXA; Carrefour
Germany 332 16.25 Daimler; E.ON; Allianz
Greece 49 2.40 Hellenic Petroleum; Eurobank Ergasias
Ireland 29 1.42 Allied Irish Banks; Ryanair
Italy 132 6.46 Eni; Assicurazioni Generali; Exor
Netherlands 87 4.26 Royal Dutch Shell; ING; Unilever
Poland 52 2.55 PKN Orlen; Lotos Kolej; KGHM Polska Miedz
Portugal 31 1.52 Galp Energia; Jeronimo Martins; Sonae
Spain 83 4.06 Banco Santander; Telefonica; Repsol
Sweden 147 7.20 Volvo; Ericsson; Nordea Bank
United Kingdom 486 23.79 BP; HSBC; Fiat Chrysler
Total 2043 100
Bank 2015). Regulatory stringency is an index of regulatory restraints that limit the
freedom of exchange in credit, labor, and product markets (Fraser Institute 2016).6
Left government measures left governing party seats as a percent of all legislative
seats (Swank 2013). Union density indicates the union density rate, that is, net union
membership as a proportion of wage earners in employment (Visser 2016). Finally,
Mandatory reporting is a binary measure indicating whether or not the country has
some form of mandatory NFR regulation in effect in a given year, based on Table
2.2.
In order to provide adequate tests of both firm-level and country-level hypothe-
ses, only firms from the 15 largest EU member states, ranked by GDP, were kept
in the data set.7 This reduces the total number of firms in the data set to the final
6The scale is reversed to that higher values denote more regulatory restraints.
7The list of countries under study includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
GRI report 22,473 0.094 0.292 0 1
GC member 22,473 0.126 0.332 0 1
CDP response 22,473 0.178 0.382 0 1
Revenue (ln) 22,473 11.037 0.188 −0.065 13.177
Profit margin (pct) 22,473 44.344 146.533 −12,000.000 9,475.265
GDP (ln) 22,473 27.893 0.945 25.940 28.891
GDP per capita (ln) 22,473 10.540 0.147 9.705 10.819
GDP growth 22,473 1.171 2.507 −9.132 7.202
Regulatory stringency 22,473 2.639 0.627 1.400 4.490
Left government 22,473 37.354 39.899 0.000 100.000
Union density 22,473 29.711 19.789 7.548 77.713
Mandatory reporting 22,473 0.446 0.497 0 1
tally of 2043. Table 3.2 breaks down the list of firms included by the country in
which firms are headquartered, providing prominent examples from each country.
Ireland and Portugal are the least represented countries, home to the headquarters
of just 1.42% and 1.52% of firms, respectively. France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom are the most represented countries, with 15.71%, 16.25%, and 23.79% of
firms, respectively. Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables in the
data set, averaged over all 24516 observations (2043 firms × 12 years).
3.3 Modeling the NFR behavior of firms
This section aims to test a variety of firm-level and country-level hypotheses relat-
ing to firms’ uptake of voluntary NFR standards. In particular, the purpose is to
determine the extent to which CSR is driven by country-level variables as opposed
to firm-level variables, as well as to specifically examine the role of public policy
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in driving firms’ reporting practices.8
To accommodate the combination of firm-level and country-level data, this sec-
tion employs multilevel logistic regression models. In each model, the dependent
variable is a binary measure of a particular NFR practice at the firm level—either
GRI report, GC member, or CDP response. To assess the amount of variation at each
level of analysis, we begin by fitting an “empty” three-level model, with no co-
variates specified. This allows us to determine, via the intraclass correlation coef-
ficient (ICC), the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that occurs at
each level of analysis—that is, at the country-level, firm-level, or year-level. In the
case of GRI reporting, the ICC indicates that approximately 89% of the variation
in reporting takes place at the firm level, with the remaining 10% at the year level.
Only about 1% of the variation is at the country level. This null finding for vari-
ation at the country level is significant, as much of the literature on comparative
CSR suggests that firms’ behavior is determined at least in part by their national
institutional context. Methodologically, it also suggests that it is unnecessary to
model the data at three levels—i.e. years nested in firms nested in countries. A
two-level model, with years nested in firms, should be sufficient.
Table 3.4 presents results from additional multilevel models that include a va-
riety of firm-level and country-level explanatory variables. Two models are pro-
vided for each of the three dependent variables. In the first model, only firm-level
covariates are included; in the second model, firm-level and country-level covari-
ates are included alongside one another. Both sets of models include year fixed
effects and a firm-level random effect, with the effect of year random over firms.9
Each model also includes a lagged dependent variable—GRI report in Models 1-
8Chapter 4 takes this approach a step further by considering the extent to which CSR is driven
by relationships among firms.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2, GC member in Models 3-4, and CDP response in Models 5-6—to account for the
fact that firms typically continue to report according to a given voluntary standard
once they begin doing so.
Looking again at results for GRI reporting, we see from the increase in the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) from Model 1 to Model 2 that adding country-
level explanatory factors does not improve model fit.10 Indeed, only in the case of
CDP, in Models 5-6, do we find an improvement in BIC from including country-
level covariates. Here we see that firms are more likely to respond to the CDP’s
request for information when they are headquartered in larger economies, with
more stringent regulations and a greater union presence. Looking specifically at
the impact of Mandatory reporting, we see that state regulation of NFR does not
appear to be driving firms’ decision to respond to the CDP. Although we do find
statistically significant coefficients for this variable in the case of the GRI and GC,
the direction of the coefficients is inconsistent—negative with GRI and positive
with GC. More importantly, as has been discussed already, adding these variables
to the model does not improve model fit, thereby reducing the weight of these
findings.
Considering the variety of firm-level factors included, as one would expect, the
coefficient for each lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically signifi-
cant across specifications. That said, the coefficient is greatest by a large degree in
the case of the Global Compact, in Models 3-4. Also as expected, the decision to
adhere to a given voluntary standard depends in part on the firm’s other reporting
practices. Being a GC member or responding to the CDP’s questionnaire makes it
more likely, for example, that a firm will produce a report in line with the GRI’s
10While the Akaike information criterion (AIC) does show an improvement in the model fit, BIC
may be the more useful indicator in this case, as it contains a greater penalty for the number of
parameters in the model.
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reporting guidelines. This kind of interdependence is considered in greater detail
in the next chapter.
We see from Table 3.4 that a firm’s economic circumstances also have an impact
on its NFR practices. Revenue (ln) appears to be an important causal factor influ-
encing both GRI reporting and CDP responses; interestingly, this does not appear
to the case in regard to GC membership. Looking at the effect of Profit margin (pct),
only GRI reporting appears tied to profitability. Finally, regarding Sector, it seems
that the reference category, Energy, may have the greatest impact on NFR practices,
as many of the coefficients for the sector variables are negative. Apart from that,
the results vary widely across specifications. Firms in the Materials and Telecom-
munications sectors appear more likely to produce GRI reports. GC membership
seems to draw from a broader range of industries, with Health Care sticking out
as unlikely source for new members. Firms working in the Financial sector appear
most likely to respond to the CDP’s request for information.
3.4 Discussion
The analysis presented here is not intended as a conclusive response to the ongo-
ing debate among scholars as to why companies engage in CSR. As indicated at the
outset, the purpose of the chapter is twofold. First, the chapter seeks to contribute
to the mirror/substitute debate by demonstrating the importance of firm-level fac-
tors. Second, the chapter seeks to provide additional empirical support for the
hypothesis that states with a greater proportion of firms participating in voluntary NFR
initiatives are more likely to implement mandatory NFR regulation by addressing the
possibility of reverse causality.
Regarding firm-level factors, the analysis presented here suggests that scholars
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focusing only on cross-national variation in CSR engagement are missing a large
part of the story. Although we do find correlations between national-level char-
acteristics and various measures of CSR engagement, the findings presented here
suggest that these trends may simply be an artifact of the particular constellation
of firms headquartered in each country. For example, if it is true that larger com-
panies are more likely to engage in CSR, what does this say about countries like
Germany, which have a larger proportion of small- and medium-sized companies
(SMEs)? Put another way, it may be that leading CSR countries, like France and
the United Kingdom, are noteworthy, not for any particular public policy (or lack
thereof) that encourages CSR, but for the fact that they are home to more large,
listed firms. In this sense, revenue may simply be a proxy for the pressure a firm
receives from NGOs, non-financial analysts, and other social actors pushing for
NFR.
In terms of reverse causality, the fact that country-level factors do not improve
model fit in the case of GRI reporting and GC membership suggests that the spike
we have observed in the uptake of NFR private regulation has not been driven by
changes in public policy. This is further supported by the case of the CDP, in which
mandatory reporting does not appear to play an important role despite the greater
explanatory power of country-level variables. Again, the implication is that firms
are reporting primarily due to some mix of firm-level (e.g. leadership, culture,
values) and transnational-level (e.g. exposure to corporate watchdogs, pressure
from investors) factors.
Chapter 4
The impact of CSR on public policy
Abstract
This chapter examines the impact of NFR networks on the develop-
ment of new mandatory state regulation in the European Union. Look-
ing again at the corporate non-financial reporting practices of Europe’s
largest listed companies over the period, 2003-2014, this chapter demon-
strates the essential role played by nonstate actors in developing vol-
untary NFR networks in the early stages of the regulatory process, ul-
timately contributing to the creation of new public policy at both the
national and EU-level.
The case studies presented in Chapter 2 indicate that a firm’s decision to disclose
non-financial data is determined not simply by firm- and country-level covariates,
such as its size or institutional context, but also by the behavior of its peers. This
chapter uses network theory and methods to examine this kind of interdepen-
dence, focusing in particular on how the private regulation of NFR has evolved
over time and how it has impacted, and been impacted by, the development of
new public policy.
Network analysis offers a number of advantages to researchers interested in
corporate social responsibility. First, network data are relational (Wasserman and
Faust 1994). Too many studies treat firms’ decisions as if they are conditionally
independent—assuming, for example, that the decision of Firm A to join a particu-
lar initiative is made without consideration to the choice of Firm B (e.g. Koos 2012).
Rather than looking simply at the attributes of different social entities, the focus in
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network analysis is on the relationships between these entities. In formal terms, it
is these entities (often referred to as nodes or vertices) and the connections between
them (referred to as ties or edges) that form the network.
Most social scientists agree that economic action is embedded in structures of
social relations (Granovetter 1985). Network methods capture these structures by
analyzing the interdependence among individuals, groups, and institutions (see
Ward and Stovel 2011; Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009). In the case
of CSR, networks are typically constituted by the relations between businesses,
NGOs, and multilateral organizations (Hirschland 2006). One advantage of the
network approach is that it allows us to treat these relationships as conditionally
dependent, where the presence of a tie between a given firm and NGO, for example,
depends on the presence of other ties between firms and NGOs in the network
(Wang et al. 2009). By confronting this kind of dependency, researchers acquire a
more realistic perspective on how networks form and change over time.
In addition to providing a more realistic depiction of firm behavior, network
analysis can also be used to link micro- and macro-level theories (Granovetter
1973). While researchers may employ network tools in order to understand micro-
level behaviors, the results often have implications for phenomena that exist at
a higher level of analysis. To bridge the gap between micro- and macro-level
theories we can look at measurements of system-level integration that refer not
only the behavior of particular actors but also to overall properties of the network
(Skvoretz and Faust 1999). In this way, network analysis can work as a measure-
ment tool, providing specific indicators that describe a phenomenon consisting of
a large number of actors and the ties between them. This chapter introduces net-
work density and clustering statistics as indicators of system-level integration in
voluntary NFR networks—that is, as measurements of how entrenched voluntary
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standards are in a particular regulatory environment—and then uses these mea-
surements in a regression analysis to estimate their impact on the development of
new public policy.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.1 provides an overview of the data
and methods used in this chapter; Section 4.2 examines the formation and evolu-
tion of voluntary NFR networks; Section 4.3 assess the impact of these networks
on public policy; Section 4.4 assess the feedback effects of new public policy on the
continued development of voluntary NFR networks; and Section 4.5 discusses the
implications of the findings and proposes topics for further research.
4.1 Methods and data
This chapter uses the multilevel data set introduced in Chapter 3 to examine the
relationship between voluntary and mandatory regulation in the case of NFR. As
in the previous chapter, the analysis here focuses on three types of non-financial
reporting: GRI reports, GC membership, and CDP responses. The data set tracks
these measures across more than 2,000 firms in 15 EU member states over the pe-
riod, 2003-2014.
In network terminology, firms, private regulatory organizations (i.e. the GRI,
CDP, and GC), and the relationships between them can be understood as constitut-
ing affiliation networks. Affiliation networks are referred to as bipartite or two-mode
networks because they consist of two distinct sets of actors—in this case, firms
and private regulators. In this type of network, only cross-mode interactions are
allowed. Firms can form ties with private regulatory organizations but not with
other firms, and likewise for private regulatory organizations. Ties in the network
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Figure 4.1: Relationships in an NFR network.
with the GRI if they report based on the GRI guidelines; firms are affiliated with
the CDP if they answer the CDP questionnaire; firms are affiliated with the GC if
they are a GC member and fulfill the GC’s reporting requirement. This relation is
dichotomous; either a firm is affiliated with a given private regulator or it is not. In
the analysis to follow, the relation is also considered undirected—in other words,
the directionality of the relation, or who initiates the tie, is not of interest.
The range of possible relationships in the network is depicted in Figure 4.1.
In this illustration, circles represent firms, diamonds represent private regulatory
organizations, and the lines between them represent ties in the network. We see
that there are a total of eight different positions for firms in the network, falling
into four general categories: (1) a firm may be tied to all three private regulatory
organizations, i.e. Firm A; (2) a firm may be tied to two of three private regulatory
organizations, i.e. Firm B, Firm C, or Firm D; (3) a firm may be tied to one of three




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2: Visualization of NFR networks in Europe
may not be tied to any of the three private regulatory organizations, i.e. Firm H.
Firms in this final category are referred to as isolates in network terminology. We
see that there are also three general types of relations from the private regulatory
organization’s point of view: (1) ties with firms that are also connected to the two
other private regulatory organizations; (2) ties with firms that are also connected
to one of the two other private regulatory organizations; and (3) ties to firms that
are not connected to any other private regulatory organization. While ties between
actors of the same mode are not permitted, it is possible to discuss these kinds of
relationships in terms of pathways. For example, we can think of Firm A as linked
to Firm F via their shared connection to CDP, just as CDP is linked to GRI via their
shared connection to Firm A and Firm B.
One of the advantages of network analysis is the ability to create thought-
provoking visualizations of our data. While we may think we have a picture in our
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minds of what some group of phenomena look like in aggregate, viewing an actual
representation of this information can bring new connections to light—hypotheses
about relationships in the data, which can then be tested. Figure 4.2 presents visu-
alizations of the entire network, including firms from all 15 EU member states, in
2003 and 2014.1 Looking at the data in this way, we first observe the large number
of isolates in the network—that is, firms that do not adhere to the reporting guide-
lines of the GRI, GC, or CDP (see the two visualizations on the left). If we choose
not to include isolates in the visualization, however, we see that the number of
firms that do report according to one or more of the standards is actually quite
large (see the two visualizations on the right). We see also that the percentage of
firms in the network with at least one tie to a private regulatory organization has
increased substantially from 2003 to 2014.
4.2 The evolution of voluntary NFR networks
A common question network scientists ask after constructing a given network vi-
sualization is, why do we observe this particular network, with all of its actors and
ties, given all of the other possible arrangements that we could have observed?
Leifeld, Cranmer and Desmarais (2015) provide a method for examining the de-
velopment of networks over time. Their approach is based on exponential random
graph modeling (ERGM), which allows researchers to estimate the likelihood of
observing a given network given certain node characteristics and network struc-
tures.2
Table 4.1 presents results from three temporal exponential random models.
1Networks produced in R using network (Butts, Handcock and Hunter 2014), sna (Butts 2014),
igraph (Csardi and Nepusz 2006), GGally (Schloerke et al. 2017), and ggplot2 (Wickham 2009).
2The xergm package in R extends the use of ERGM by allowing for the inclusion of temporal
dependencies between repeated observations of a network at discrete time steps.
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These models are designed as an alternative to the multilevel models presented in
Chapter 3. Both sets of models consider the impact of both firm-level (i.e. revenue,
profit margin, and sector) and country-level (i.e. mandatory reporting, GDP, GDP
per capita, GDP growth, regulatory stringency, left government, and union den-
sity) factors. However, whereas multilevel models assume that each firm makes
its decision to join a voluntary initiative independently, temporal ERGMs allow
the researcher to consider specific forms of interdependency that one may observe
in the network. In this case, the model includes additional terms indicating the
coincident node count for actors in the second mode of the network—that is, firms
that are tied to both GRI and GC, both GRI and CDP, or both GC and CDP. The
model also includes a memory term, Lagged network, for ties that existed in the
network in the previous time period.
Positive coefficients in Table 4.1 indicate that a given node characteristic or net-
work structure increases the likelihood of a tie forming in the network. Thus, we
see from the coincidence terms that a tie between a firm and a given private regu-
latory organization are increasingly common when that firm is already tied to one
or more private regulators. The positive coefficient for Lagged network indicates
that these ties are also likely to persist across time periods. Moving on to node
characteristics, we find once again that larger firms are more likely form ties in the
network. Such participation in voluntary NFR schemes does not appear to be re-
lated to profitability, however. The impact of Sector is varied. Once again, we see
that many of the coefficients for sector variables are negative, suggesting that firms
in the Energy sector, our reference group, are more likely form ties with either the
GRI, GC, or CDP. The results indicate that this is particularly true when compar-
ing these firms to those from the Financial sector. Looking at country-level factors,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































porting that firms are more likely to form ties with private regulators if they are
headquartered in a country in which non-financial reporting is mandatory. Simi-
larly, firms are more likely to form a tie in the network if their country of origin is
wealthier—that is, with higher values of GDP per capita (ln).
Although it is useful to analyze the entire network of EU firms, it is also helpful
to examine each country-level network individually. If we assemble the data in
this way, we can produce 180 separate networks—one for each country-year (15
countries× 12 years). Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 present visualizations of voluntary
networks in Denmark, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in 2004. As de-
scribed above, for each vertex, the color and shape indicate its mode: red diamonds
are private regulatory organizations and blue circles are firms. For each firm, the
size of its circle is proportional to the natural logarithm of its total revenue.
We see from these illustrations that private regulators are pulling firms together
into clusters, often beginning with the largest firms in the network. This includes
many of the most well-known firms in each country, including Novo Nordisk in
Denmark, Total in France, H&M in Sweden, and BP in the United Kingdom. As
discussed in Chapter 2, these firms are often the first ones to be targeted by NGOs.
However, while their size makes them vulnerable to corporate watchdogs, it also
creates opportunities for them to use CSR as a way to appeal to large institutional
and socially responsible investors. As a result, it is not surprising to see these firms
not only with ties in the network at this relatively early stage (i.e. in 2004) but also
with ties to multiple private regulatory organizations.
This relates to another characteristic of these networks, which is the overlap we
observe between each affiliation network. That is, some firms are affiliated with
both the GRI and GC, or both the GRI and CDP, and so on. It is also important to
note that, although not depicted in these visualizations, each network contains a
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relatively large number of isolates—firms that are not tied to any private regulator.
Although these firms are excluded from the visualizations presented here, they are
included in the analysis above and to follow because they could affiliate with one
or more of the private regulators but choose not to. This overlap between affiliation
networks and the large number of isolates both highlight an important question,
which is how researchers ought to measure a phenomenon such as voluntary NFR
regulation. While tracking the number of firms involved in a particular initiative,
like GRI, is certainly one option, this would neglect a great deal of additional in-
formation that is likely to be relevant to any analysis of the larger phenomenon.
For example, given the large number of isolates, one might want to retain infor-
mation about the likelihood of any firm having a tie in the network. Similarly,
the researcher may also be interested in the degree to which firms cluster around
particular voluntary standards or groups of standards. As we will see in the next
section, it is possible to derive both types of measurements from these networks
for use as indicators of system-level integration in each country-year.
4.3 The impact of NFR networks on public policy
The purpose of this section is to introduce measures of system-level integration
that can be used to describe the evolution of voluntary NFR networks and to ex-
amine how these networks have impacted the development of public policy.
Although traditionally network analysis has focused mostly on one-mode net-
works (i.e. networks with only one set of actors), in recent years researchers have
begun developing additional tools for analyzing structures in two-mode networks
(Borgatti and Everett 1997; Faust et al. 2002). Basic structures in two-mode net-

























































































































Figure 4.3: Private regulatory network visualizations from Denmark (top) and
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Figure 4.4: Private regulatory network visualizations from Sweden (top) and the
United Kingdom (bottom) in 2004. Shape size for companies is proportionate to
total revenue.
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A two-star is present when an actor from one mode is tied to two actors from an-
other mode. In this case, there are firm two-stars, in which a given firm is tied to
two different private regulators, and private regulator two-stars, in which a given
private regulator is tied to two different firms. This kind of structure can be a
source of dependency in the network. That is, whether Firm A is tied to private reg-
ulator X may depend on whether Firm A is also tied to private regulator Y (in the
case of a firm two-star). Alternatively, whether Firm A is tied to private regulator
X may depend on whether Firm B is tied to X (in the case of a private regulator
two-star). These kinds of network structures can produce isomorphic effects, with
actors becoming more similar as they try to change (DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989). Similarly, three-paths occur when an actor
from one mode is tied indirectly to an actor from another mode through its connec-
tion to another actor from that mode. For instance, looking again at Figure 4.1, a
three-path occurs between Firm B and GC since Firm B is connected to CDP, which
is connected to Firm C, which is connected to GRI (i.e. Firm B → CDP → Firm
C → GC). In the event that a tie forms between Firm B and GC, the three-path is
closed and become a four-cycle, which is the smallest possible cycle in a two-mode
network.
Structures such as three-paths and four-cycles are helpful when considering
how actors are clustered in the network. For instance, in this example, these struc-
tures indicate whether it is more likely that firms will loosely cluster into distinct
cliques—that is, between groups of firms and particular private regulators—or
whether they instead tend to tightly cluster into one cohesive group. While clus-
tering can be apparent in a network visualization, more precise measures can be
constructed based on network structures. Robins and Alexander (2004) propose a
clustering measure equal to the ratio of three-paths to four-cycles:
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The more three-paths that close into four-cycles, the higher the score (representing






Note that a six-cycle is the largest possible cycle for this particular network, as
there are only three actors in the second mode. The interpretation is the same: the
higher the score, the tighter the clustering. Skvoretz and Faust (1999) argue that
the prevalence of short paths between pairs of actors or pairs of events is indicative
of system-level integration.
Since in this case the network contains a large number of isolates—firms that
cannot lie on a path of any length to another firm because they have no ties)—
it makes sense to use the two clustering measures above plus bipartite density as
substitute measures. Bipartite density is a basic measurement of two-mode net-
works, equal to the total number of ties in a network divided the number of total
possible ties in the network (Latapy, Magnien and Vecchio 2008). It is equivalent
to the probability of a tie existing between any given firm and any given private
regulatory organization in the network:
Bipartite density =
Number of ties in the network
No. of first-mode actors×No. of second-mode actors (4.3)
Table 4.1 presents these network properties averaged over all countries and years,
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● Bipartite Density Clustering (Robins and Alexander) Clustering (Opsahl)
Figure 4.5: Change in network properties over time. Vertical lines mark the enact-
ment of new corporate non-financial reporting legislation.
as a separate network exists for each country and year in the data set. Figure 4.5
illustrates the upward trend in both clustering and density in four of the countries
in which we find mandatory NFR regulation: Denmark, France, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom.3 The consolidation of voluntary NFR networks well in advance
of new public policy observed here suggests the possibility of a causal relationship
between the private and state regulation of corporate non-financial reporting. As
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suggested in Chapter 2, it seems as though there may be a tipping point in the de-
velopment of voluntary NFR networks that somehow leads to the creation of new
public policy. Given the network measures developed here, that is an empirical
question that we may now be able to answer.
4.3.1 Hypotheses and model
As described above, the key independent variable of interest here is the develop-
ment of the voluntary NFR network in each country-year, represented by bipartite
density and clustering statistics—indicated below by Bipartite density, Clustering
(Robins and Alexander), and Clustering (Opsahl). These variables are used to test
the central hypothesis of this section: Countries with denser and/or more tightly clus-
tered voluntary networks are more likely to implement mandatory corporate non-financial
reporting regulation.
The development of voluntary networks is not the only factor to be considered,
of course. Policymakers often legislate based on ideological considerations, and
thus it may be that state regulation in this case is associated with left- or right-
wing governments (Gilardi 2010). Since corporate non-financial reporting is of-
ten associated with neoliberalism, one might expect state regulation to be more
likely in right party governments, as indicated by lower values of Left govern-
ment. Policymakers may also decide whether or not to adopt a new institution
based on its complementarity with existing institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001).
In the vast “varieties of capitalism” literature, scholars often contrast the liberal
market economies of the UK and USA, which rely heavily on market forms of
coordination, with the coordinated market economies of Germany and Sweden,
which favor non-market forms of coordination (Kang and Moon 2012; Matten and
3Network statistics for other countries in the data set are provided in Figure B.5.
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Table 4.2: National-level descriptive statistics, 2003-2014
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Non-financial reporting legislation 180 0.244 0.431 0 1
Bipartite density 180 0.117 0.078 0.000 0.325
Clustering (Robins and Alexander) 180 0.381 0.228 0.000 0.800
Clustering (Opsahl) 180 0.159 0.148 0.000 0.523
Number of firms 180 136.200 130.538 29 486
Left government 180 32.805 34.658 0.000 100.000
Union density 180 34.019 20.816 7.548 77.713
Regulatory stringency 180 2.722 0.629 1.400 4.490
GDP per capita (logged) 180 10.501 0.230 9.654 10.819
GDP growth 180 1.158 2.835 −9.132 7.202
Time 180 5.039 3.682 1 12
Time squared 180 38.872 44.476 1 144
Time cubed 180 353.706 506.445 1 1,728
Moon 2008; Kinderman 2012). Again, due to the association between corporate
non-financial reporting and neoliberalism, one might expect that state regulation
would be less likely in countries with a high degree of Union density or greater Reg-
ulatory stringency. As countries in the data set vary greatly according to size, the
models presented in Table 4.3 also include a variable, Number of firms, represent-
ing the total number of firms in each network.4 These models also control for the
overall quality of a country’s institutions, as measured by GDP per capita (logged),
as well as each country’s GDP growth. Summary statistics for all variables include
can be found in Table 4.2.
To demonstrate the impact of private regulation on public policy in the case of
NFR, this section presents a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis of 15 EU
countries over the period, 2003-2014. The dependent variable is a binary mea-
surement of state regulation based on the information presented in Table 2.2. This
variable takes on the value 1 in years in which some form of mandatory corpo-
4This variable is included in place of GDP (logged), as the two measures are highly correlated
(r = 0.74).
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rate non-financial reporting regulation exists; otherwise it is equal to 0. The main
problem with binary dependent variables in TSCS studies is the possibility of tem-
poral dependence—that is, the value of the outcome in one time period being some
function of the value of the outcome at other periods. This is particularly true in
this case, as countries that implement regulation in a given year will almost cer-
tainly have that regulation in place the following year as well.5 To address this
issue, this analysis employs the cubic polynomial approximation recommended
by Carter and Signorino (2010).6 With this approach, the data are treated similarly
to how they would be in an event history analysis, which models the amount of
time that transpires before an event. Although the parameters of this model are
estimated using logistic regression, the three cubic polynomials of the time vari-
able are included to control for the effect of temporally dependent observations.
Thus, the model includes a variable, Time, equal to the number of years between
the beginning of the period under study, 2003 in this case, and the first occurrence
of the event—i.e. the implementation of new public policy—plus squared and cu-
bic terms, which are used to trace the path of duration dependence in the period
preceding an event.
4.3.2 Results
Table 4.3 presents results from four logistic regression models, testing the hypothe-
ses presented above. As predicted, the results support the key hypothesis put for-
ward in this chapter: the development of voluntary NFR networks increases the
likelihood of new state regulation. All three network statistics have a positive, sta-
tistically significant, and substantive effect on the outcome under study. The mag-
5Results from a likelihood ratio test of this model and an ordinary logit model show duration
dependence.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































95% confidence interval 90% confidence interval
Figure 4.6: The effect of network density on the likelihood of mandatory NFR reg-
ulation.
nitude of the effect of bipartite density, based on Model 2, is illustrated in Figure
4.6. This figure plots the predicted probability of new public policy as the bipar-
tite density of the network increases. As expected, state regulation is extremely
unlikely when the network density is low; however, as as the density of the net-
work increases, the probability of new public policy rises dramatically. Of course,
the relationship is far from deterministic. As indicated by the wide 95% confidence
bands surrounding the predictions, further development of the voluntary network
does not guarantee that new public policy is on the way. Instead, private regula-
tion appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for new public policy in
this case.
Interestingly, once temporal dependencies are taken into account, the model
does not lend much support to hypotheses about political or institutional factors.
Aside from the network measures described above, only the number of firms in the
network appears to have a strong connection to the development of public policy.
Though there is some evidence that the likelihood of new state regulation is greater
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under center-right governments, this is only demonstrated in Model 2. In the case
of non-market coordination in the institutional environment, the results are again
supportive only in Model 2. The impact of regulatory stringency, meanwhile, is
negative and significant only in Models 3-4.
4.4 The impact of public policy on existing NFR networks
In cases where private regulation has led to the development of new public policy,
what effect has this had on existing voluntary NFR networks? This section uses
a regression discontinuity (RD) design to examine this question, focusing on the
feedback effects of new public policy in Denmark, France, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. RD designs seek to mimic experimental research designs by assigning
observations to pre- and post-treatment groups via a cutoff or threshold of an ob-
served variable. Here, we compare the bipartite density of each private regulatory
network before and after the implementation of new public policy. Time before
new public policy is used as the assignment variable, with the cutoff being one
year after the adoption of new public policy.7 Thus, network densities in the years
leading up to public policy form the pre-treatment group of observations, while
network densities in the years following constitute the post-treatment group.
To compare the results, a simple linear model is estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimation. The dependent variable, bipartite network density, is
regressed against the continuous assignment variable (i.e. years before public pol-
icy), a treatment variable (equal to 0 if the observation is in the pre-treatment group
and 1 if it is in the post-treatment group), and their interaction. Table 4.4 shows the
results of each model—for Denmark, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,
7This is an example of a “sharp” (as opposed to “fuzzy”) RD design because the level of treat-
ment rises from 0 to 1 exactly at the cutoff point (Nichols 2007).
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Denmark France Sweden UK
Intercept 0.093∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
Time before public policy 0.012∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Public policy 0.073∗∗∗ −0.015 0.038∗ 0.022
(0.015) (0.008) (0.019) (0.018)
Time x Public policy −0.004 0.004 0.003 −0.012∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.977 0.982 0.981 0.967
Adj. R2 0.969 0.975 0.974 0.954
Num. obs. 12 12 12 12
RMSE 0.013 0.007 0.015 0.013
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.4: Discontinuity in linear models using ordinary least squares (OLS) esti-
mation. DV = bipartite density of the private regulatory network.
respectively—which are explained in detail below, both graphically and in the text.
As we see in Table 4.4, the effect of the treatment variable, Public policy, is sub-
stantive and statistically significant in the case of both Denmark (β = 0.073; p <
0.01) and Sweden (β = 0.038; p < 0.10), indicating that the treatment results in a
change in the intercept of the regression line—that is, the implementation of public
policy leads to an immediate increase in the density of the voluntary network. The
interaction effect, Time × Public policy, which refers to the slope of the regression
line, is relatively weak and not significant—meaning, the implementation of public
policy did not change the network’s rate of growth. These results appear more in-
tuitively in Figure 4.7. Here we see two regression lines, that of the pre-treatment
group and the post-treatment groups, with 95% confidence intervals. While the
slopes of these lines are more or or less equivalent, the post-treatment regression
line has a higher intercept. The difference in intercepts in this case represents a
positive treatment effect.
Table 4.4 shows different results for the United Kingdom. Here the treatment
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● Before public policy After public policy
Figure 4.7: Regression lines for pre- and post-treatment groups. The change in
intercept indicates a treatment effect (e.g. Denmark); the change in slope indicates
an interaction effect (e.g. the United Kingdom).
effect is slightly smaller than in Denmark or Sweden, and it is not statistically sig-
nificant. The interaction effect, however, is negative and statistically significant
(β = −0.012; p < 0.10). Thus, in the case of the UK, not only did the implementa-
tion of public policy fail to produce to an immediate increase in network density, it
also caused the voluntary network to grow at a lower rate over the following years.
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Again, these results appear in a more intuitive fashion in Figure 4.7, where we see
a clear decrease in the slope of the regression line from the pre-treatment group to
post-treatment group.
In the case of France, the introduction of additional state regulation in 2010
did not produce either an influx of new firms to the voluntary NFR network or a
significant change in the network’s rate of growth. This is perhaps unsurprising
given that many firms had already been forced to report in some fashion since
2001, when the French government implemented its first NFR requirement.
4.5 Discussion
This chapter demonstrates that greater clustering and density in private regula-
tory networks increases the likelihood of new state regulation in the case of cor-
porate non-financial reporting, and that these effects transcend political and insti-
tutional conditions. Well-developed private regulatory networks—that is, denser,
and therefore more tightly clustered, networks—represent a signal of consensus
to policymakers, ensuring that, while many companies may still not be reporting,
those that do generally operate according to the same rules and frameworks. They
also represent the formation of new coalitions—consisting of firms, NGOs, consul-
tancies, and other professional organizations—that support at least some form of
regulation in this area.
While it has been argued that private regulation crowds out support for formal
rules (e.g. Kaplan 2015; Werner 2012), such an argument overlooks the dynamics
created by both the strengths and the weaknesses of voluntary standards. In this case,
private regulators have succeeded in designing new rules and frameworks with
a broad base of support among important societal actors, including multilateral
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organizations, institutional investors, and large, high-profile companies. At the
same time, private regulators have struggled greatly with implementation. Large
numbers of companies still do not report, and there is considerable variation in
the quality of reporting among those that do. Thus, in this case it is the middling
status of private regulation that sets the stage for public policy: private regulation
has become strong enough to gain legitimacy but not strong enough to succeed on
its own.
In network terminology, the persistent presence of a large number of isolates
in the network is important. If all companies are reporting, and the quality of
reporting is adequate, one could argue that there is nothing left for public policy to
achieve. The development of the voluntary NFR network is also important. If no
companies are reporting based on private standards, policymakers may view state
regulation as a potentially unpopular and therefore risky proposition. However, if
a sizable portion of influential companies demonstrate, through their participation
in voluntary NFR networks, consensus around a set of rules, policymakers are in a
stronger position to extend those rules to other firms through binding regulation.
Overall, these results indicate that emerging forms of private business regula-
tion do not represent a clear threat to traditional forms of state regulation. In fact,
rather than crowding out support for public policy, private regulators appear to be
gathering it. In the case of corporate non-financial reporting, most policymakers
appeared either uninterested in corporate non-financial reporting or unwilling to
intervene prior to the development of voluntary NFR networks. Only by bringing
together a large network of companies were organizations like the GRI, GC, and
CDP able to put the issue of corporate non-financial reporting on the legislative
agenda.
Moving from the macro- back to the micro-level, these findings also echo the
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efforts of scholars like Scherer and Palazzo (2011), who sketch out a new political
role for business. Whether they intend to or not, companies impact the develop-
ment of public policy through their decision to participate in CSR networks. While
many companies view their participation (or lack thereof) as a response to the de-
mands of key stakeholder groups—including investors, employees, and business
partners—they would do well to view it also as a signal to policymakers about
what should and should not be regulated.
Finally, the results also indicate new possibilities for collaboration between
public and private regulators. While private regulation can set the stage for new
public policy, the implementation of new formal rules can also boost participation
in voluntary networks while incentivizing private regulators to ratchet up existing
standards. Though this may be a two-stage process, it can also be part of a cycle
that leads back to more public policy—as we see in France, in 2001 and 2010.
Chapter 5
The politics of NFR in the European Union
Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between network governance
and the development of corporate NFR policy in the European Union.
Using an actor-centered approach, the chapter shows how network gov-
ernance can strengthen the bargaining position of particular groups in
the policymaking process. In this case, private standard setters and
other non-governmental organizations were able to successfully press
for a new EU directive in large part due to the powerful positions they
held in the network governance structure. While business interests
largely opposed the new directive throughout the policymaking pro-
cess, they had in fact already conferred a portion of their influence to
NGOs, prior to these negotiations, by adhering to voluntary sustain-
ability standards.
The European Union passed a new directive in April 2014 requiring all listed
companies with more than 500 employees to disclose information related to non-
financial (i.e. social and environmental) performance. While voluntary report-
ing by companies on non-financial issues had been rising steadily over the past
decade1, the majority of European companies opposed efforts to mandate corpo-
rate non-financial reporting at either the national or EU level (Kinderman 2013).
Given that corporate non-financial reporting is a relatively low-salience issue for
most citizens, one might have expected, based on the work of Culpepper (2011)
for example, that business interests would exert control over the policymaking
1European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC as Regards Disclosure of Non-
Financial and Diversity Information by Certain Large Companies and Groups,” April 2013.
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process, warding off additional state regulation—and yet the directive was in fact
enacted over their objections. Why?
As recent reports have shown, the directive was the result of a lengthy and
highly contested policymaking process that played strongly on national interests.2
France, which had already developed similar regulations at the national-level,
lobbied in support of the directive for instance, while Germany, which had not
passed similar legislation, strongly opposed it.3 This chapter adds to this discus-
sion through an analysis of the European Commission’s public consultation on
corporate non-financial reporting, which took place in 2011. The analysis validates
recent accounts of the national divisions at play while also revealing important di-
visions among the various social actors involved that extend across national bor-
ders. While business associations largely opposed the directive, for instance, the
public consultation reveals a broad base of support, not just among nongovern-
mental organizations and trade unions, but also among accountants, investors,
and many individual companies. This chapter suggests that such support is the
result of both domestic regulation and, perhaps more importantly, transnational
private regulation, which had been developing steadily in Europe since the early
2000s.
5.1 Corporate non-financial reporting in the European Union
Corporate non-financial reporting has emerged over the past decade as an impor-
tant new area for public policy at both the national and EU level. As described
in Chapter 2, however, when NFR first emerged it was almost exclusively a vol-
2Richard Howitt, “The EU law on non-financial reporting—how we got there,” The Guardian, 16
April 2014.
3Daniel Kinderman, “The Politics of Corporate Transparency and the Struggles over the Non-
Financial Reporting Directive 2014/95/EU,” The CLS Blue Sky Blog, 1 September 2015.
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untary enterprise commonly associated with the concept of corporate social re-
sponsibility. The shift from voluntary to mandatory disclosure represents a critical
turning point in the evolution of corporate non-financial reporting regulation. As
discussed in Chapter 1, the change is evident in the European Commission’s own
conceptualization of CSR. In a green paper from 2001, it defined CSR as “a concept
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business
operations and in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.”4
Ten years later, in 2011, the European Commission revised its definition to simply
“the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society.”5 What happened in
the interim? To answer this question, the following sections consider the role of
both domestic policy and transnational private regulation in shaping preferences
toward NFR regulation.
5.1.1 Domestic policy as a driver of EU policy
As discussed in Chapter 2, several EU member states enacted mandatory NFR
regulations in the period between 2001 and 2011.
France. France became the first country to mandate comprehensive corporate
non-financial reporting in 2001 when the Parliament adopted Article 116 of the
New Economic Regulations. Although the law was limited in scope, it introduced
the practice of non-financial reporting to many of France’s largest companies and
solidified a place for corporate transparency in the country’s sustainable develop-
ment agenda. The issue was revisited in 2007 when the French Ministry of Envi-
ronment started the ‘Grenelle for environment’ dialogue on sustainable develop-
4European Commission, “Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity,” Green Paper DOC/01/9, July 2001.
5European Commission, “Summary Report of the Responses Received to the Public Consulta-
tion on Disclosure of Non-Financial Information by Companies,” April 2011.
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ment. These discussions produced an updated and more stringent set of reporting
requirements, included in the Grenelle II regulations in July 2010.6 The Grenelle II
requirements greatly expanded upon those of the NRE, requiring more companies
to report on a wider range of social and environmental performance indicators.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom announced its own NFR requirement—
the Operating and Financial Review—in July 2003.7 As mentioned, the OFR was
a comprehensive regulation intended to serve as a vehicle for corporate social and
environmental reporting in the UK.8 However, despite its growing support among
the business community, Gordon Brown decided to abandon the OFR in 2005 in
favor of a more limited, narrative reporting requirement, which the government
adopted in 2006. Though Brown claimed to base his decision on the fact that the
OFR would have exceeded requirements of the 2003 EU accounting amendments,
many observers viewed it as a blatant attempt to appear pro-business (Rowbottom
and Schroeder 2014).
Nordic countries. Rather than seek new regulation that would apply broadly
to Sweden’s largest companies, the Swedish government opted to mandate non-
financial reporting for state-owned companies only. This new law, passed in Novem-
ber 2007, required all companies in which the government has an ownership stake—
including 40 companies wholly owned by the government and 15 partially owned
companies—to produce a non-financial report.9 At the same time that Sweden
was working on new reporting requirements for state-owned companies, Den-
6French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development, Transport and Housing, “Le Grenelle
Environnement,” December 2010.
7British Department of Trade and Industry, “The Operating and Financial Review: Practical
Guidance for Directors,” May 2004.
8The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, “The Operating and Financial Review: A
Catalyst for Improved Corporate Social and Environmental Disclosure?,” Research Report No. 89,
2005.
9Swedish Ministry of Finance, “Guidelines for external reporting by state-owned companies,”
November 2007.
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mark was working on its own, more ambitious legislation. With a greater propor-
tion of its companies engaged in CSR, Denmark passed a comprehensive reporting
requirement in 2008 that required all large companies (in addition to state-owed
companies) to disclose non-financial information. Although most of these compa-
nies did not fulfill the requirement in the first year, by 2013 more than 95 percent of
large companies in Denmark produced a non-financial report in compliance with
the law.10
Other Member States. No other Member State, with the exception of Spain,
implemented any type of comprehensive NFR requirement during this period. As
noted earlier, some of these countries, like Germany, have a far lesser proportion
of large, listed companies compared to France or the UK, and, as a result, may not
see the relevancy of NFR regulation at the national level. Other countries, such
as Poland, also lack a national policy legacy that might support more stringent
regulations on business activity.
5.1.2 Transnational private regulation as a driver of EU policy
During the period between 2001 and 2011, many different types of non-state actors
were also forming preferences for NFR regulation based on their own interests and
experiences with both domestic policy and voluntary regulations.
Accountants/Auditors. Despite its recent emergence, corporate non-financial re-
porting regulation is often considered alongside the rigorous standards established
through many decades of corporate financial reporting (Etzion and Ferraro 2010).
Chief among these is the expectation that corporate disclosures be subjected to
third-party verification. While prominent accounting firms have seized the oppor-
10Danish Business Authority, Corporate Social Responsibility and Reporting in Denmark: Impact
of the third year subject to the legal requirements for reporting on CSR in the Danish Financial
Statements Act,”, March 2013.
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tunity to provide additional assurance, including the ‘Big Four’—Deloitte, Price-
waterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, and KPMG—many companies are hesitant to
subject their non-financial reports to a third-party audit, often because they lack
confidence in their own reporting or because they do not believe the added ex-
pense is worthwhile. As a result, accountants and auditors find themselves in
a precarious middle ground between a potentially fruitful source of growth and
their own wary clients.
Business Associations. As mentioned, corporate non-financial reporting ini-
tially emerged as a purely voluntary activity performed by a relatively small num-
ber of large, listed companies. Although this number has increased rapidly over
time, the vast majority of companies—especially non-listed firms and small- or
medium-sized firms—choose not to report on non-financial performance. While
business associations may recognize the value of non-financial disclosure and work
to improve the disclosure practices of its members, they may also feel obligated to
appeal to the majority of their members and oppose any form of mandatory NFR.
Companies. Firm preferences related to non-financial reporting vary widely
across a number of attributes, including firm size, ownership, industry, and coun-
try of origin. While it has become commonplace for the very largest, listed compa-
nies to report on non-financial performance, participation rates are much lower for
other types of companies, and thus one can infer that, on average, companies’ at-
titudes toward reporting remain negative. Even among those firms that do report,
many favor a voluntary approach with minimal government oversight.
Investors. Corporate non-financial disclosure practices have emerged in large
part due to growing demand from investors. Socially responsible investment de-
veloped first as way to screen investment options for religious organizations that
did not want to profit from the sale of alcohol, tobacco, firearms, etc. As discussed
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in Chapter 2, SRI emerged on the global stage in the 1970s through efforts to end
Apartheid through divestment from South African businesses, and it took on new
purpose through highly publicized corporate disasters such as Union Carbide’s
deadly gas leak in Bhopal and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in the 1980s and early-
1990s. Many of the individuals leading the SRI movement during this time played
prominent roles in the development of new corporate non-financial reporting stan-
dards in the late-1990s and 2000s. Still, while more investors are beginning to uti-
lize non-financial data—for example, as a proxy for overall management quality—
SRI remains a niche industry. As is the case with corporate participation, investors
using non-financial information are vastly outnumbered by those that do not.
NGOs. While socially responsible investors have been a key driver of corporate
non-financial reporting practices, the public interest movement of the 1970s and
beyond has played a critical role as well. Though some companies have been will-
ing to disclose non-financial information in order to attract SRI dollars, for many
the main concern is protecting brand reputation by avoiding negative publicity.
Nongovernmental organizations that “name and shame” corporate wrongdoers,
or bring attention to social and environmental issues, represent one of business’s
greatest adversaries in the public sphere. While NGOs are likely to view corpo-
rate disclosures with suspicion, they are, along with socially responsible investors
and non-financial analysts, also among the most likely to actually read the reports
produced, and thus more likely to look favorably upon mandatory reporting re-
quirements.
Standard Setters. It cannot be taken as given that organizations which have
established corporate non-financial reporting standards—and this includes certain
analysts and ratings organizations which act as de facto standard setters by pro-
viding companies with disclosure criteria—are necessarily in favor of new public
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policy. Not only might standard setters, as experts in the field, not agree with the
proposed rules, but they also might not want to contribute to their own obsoles-
cence by endorsing national rules that could conceivably substitute for existing
voluntary standards. At the same time, standard setting organizations are likely
to recognize the drawbacks of a purely voluntary regulatory framework and are
therefore likely to support new public policy initiatives.
Trade Unions. Trade unions have often been skeptical of CSR, which some
view as a Trojan horse for neoliberalism, representing business interests and fa-
voring market-based solutions to social and environmental problems that might
otherwise be solved through coordination. At the same time, many of their objec-
tives could well be advanced through more (and better) corporate disclosure.
Other actors—Consultants, Academics, Citizens. In addition to the actors de-
scribed above, there are a number of peripheral organizations and individuals that
also have a stake in corporate non-financial reporting regulation. Among these
are consultants, academics, and concerned citizens. Although expectations vary
across these groups, in general we would expect organizations and individuals
that do not fall under one of the actor types above to be at least somewhat sup-
portive of new regulation.
5.2 Measuring preferences using public consultation data
This section attempts to evaluate the relative impact of the various factors listed
above through an analysis of the EU’s public consultation on corporate non-financial
reporting. The goal is first to assess the range of preferences by respondent and to
compare these preferences by country of origin and actor type. The consultation
ran from 22 November 2010 to 24 January 2011 and received 259 responses, of
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# Topic Coding Dimension
Q1 Current disclosure regime Very Good = 0; Good = 1; Sufficient =
2; Poor = 3; Very poor = 4.
Content/Process
Q4 Issues to disclose Other/Missing = 0; Policy/Risks/Info
= 1; Policy & Risks/Policy &
Info/Risks & Info = 2; Policy &
Risks & Info = 3.
Content
Q5 Disclosure method Other/Missing = 0; Principles/KPIs =
1; Principles & KPIs = 2.
Process
Q5a Sector-based KPIs Missing = 0; General/Sector = 1; Gen-
eral & Sector = 2.
Process
Q7 Human rights disclosures No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1. Content
Q8 Corruption and bribery
disclosures
No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1. Content
Q9 Mandatory disclosure for
companies
None = 0; All other answer choices = 1. Content
Q10 Mandatory disclosure for
institutional investors
No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1. Content
Q11 Integrated reporting No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1. Process
Q12 External auditors No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1. Process
Table 5.1: Public consultation questions and coding.
which 192 are authorized for publication.11 The public consultation questionnaire
consists of twelve questions, summarized in Table 5.1, related to corporate non-
financial reporting.12 As each question probes a different aspect of the same un-
derlying topic—that is, the resondent’s general attitude toward the development
of new NFR regulation at the EU level—answers to these questions are likely to
be highly correlated. However, while the answers may be correlated, they are un-
likely to overlap completely. Thus in order to accurately gauge the respondent’s
overall attitude, each question needs to be considered.
As described below, principal component analysis (PCA) is a useful strategy
11European Commission, “Summary Report of the Responses Received to the Public Consulta-
tion on Disclosure of Non-Financial Information by Companies,” April 2011.
12See Appendix D.1 for questions and coding.
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Variables Q1 Q4 Q5 Q5a Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Q1 1.000
Q4 0.533 1.000
Q5 0.352 0.502 1.000
Q5a 0.390 0.511 0.673 1.000
Q7 0.417 0.705 0.387 0.467 1.000
Q8 0.432 0.676 0.417 0.516 0.770 1.000
Q9 0.284 0.412 0.345 0.299 0.402 0.416 1.000
Q10 0.386 0.624 0.334 0.481 0.626 0.656 0.420 1.000
Q11 0.424 0.507 0.486 0.451 0.415 0.415 0.350 0.447 1.000
Q12 0.449 0.562 0.505 0.482 0.504 0.532 0.388 0.497 0.526 1.000
Table 5.2: Public consultation response correlations.
when dealing with measurement problems such as this. Using PCA, we can re-
duce a large number of highly correlated variables into a smaller number of com-
ponents, which together explain most of the variation observed across the full set
of variables. In this case, PCA allows us to reduce the data produced from the
questionnaire into a single measure, which can be viewed as a representation of
the respondent’s overall attitude toward the proposed directive. The result is a
score, ranging from 1 to 100, that signifies the respondent’s overall support for a
new directive, with higher scores representing greater support.
5.2.1 Principal component analysis
Principal component analysis reduces a set of variables into a smaller number of
components. This procedure is only warranted when several variables of interest
are highly correlated (r > 0.5). In such a case, it may be useful to find a common
component, or set of components, which explains the variation across these vari-
ables. In this case, the correlation matrix indicates that respondents’ answers to
the ten public consultation questions under analysis are, for the most part, highly
correlated—see Table 5.2. Rather than deal with a large group of related variables,
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Table 5.3: Principal component analysis (PCA) results.
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Component 1 5.31 4.32 0.53 0.53
Component 2 0.99 0.25 0.10 0.63
Component 3 0.74 0.02 0.07 0.70
Component 4 0.72 0.16 0.07 0.77
Component 5 0.56 0.09 0.06 0.83
Component 6 0.47 0.05 0.05 0.88
Component 7 0.42 0.10 0.04 0.92
Component 8 0.33 0.07 0.03 0.95
Component 9 0.26 0.37 0.03 0.98
Component 10 0.22 0.02 1.00
we use PCA to produce a smaller set of component variables that capture most of
the variation we observe across all of the consultation responses.
The PCA procedure generates ten components, one for each variable, which
together explain the entire scope of variation across the group of variables. By de-
sign, the first component explains the greatest amount of variation across the orig-
inal ten variables. As shown in Table 5.3, each subsequent component explains a
smaller amount of the remaining variation until finally all variation is explained
by all ten components. Thus, the first component, or set of components, functions
as an aggregate measure of the original variables. Typically, the number of com-
ponents needed depends on how highly correlated the original variables are. In
this case, correlation between the variables is consistently high, so it is likely that a
small number of components will be sufficient to account for most of the variation.
For a more precise determination of how many components should be retained,
a scree plot is useful (see Figure 5.1). The scree plot graphs the eigenvalue of the
correlation/covariance matrix against each component. We look for (1) compo-
nents with eigenvalues greater than one and (2) components that occur above the
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Figure 5.1: Scree plot
component needs to be retained for further analysis.
We can also use the components generated through PCA to explore relation-
ships between the original ten variables. The loading plot shown in Figure 5.2
shows how well each of the first two components explains, or loads, each of the ten
variables. Variables located near each other in this two dimensional space behave
in a similar way. In this case, we note first that there is no obvious outlier—that is,
each response seems related to at least one other response. Furthermore, we see a
particularly close connection among responses to Q4, Q7, Q8, and Q10 as well as
Q5 and Q5a.
Finally, to make the first component easier to interpret, we transform the values
to fit on a 100-point scale.13 Having assigned each respondent a score, we can
then look at how these scores vary across the sample by country and by actor
13For a full list of scores, see Table D.1. Figure D.1 presents a histogram of first component from


























Figure 5.2: Principal component analysis loading plot
type.14 In Table 5.4 we see the average score by country. Although observations are
not distributed equally across countries, we can infer from this table a clear battle
line between French and German respondents. Similar divisions are also apparent
when we examine the response scores across different types of actors in Table 5.5.
Again, though not all actor types are equally represented, we see a clear distinction
between business associations, who have the most negative views on average, and
NGOs, standard setters, and labor unions, who have the most positive views.
5.3 Analyzing the determinants of preferences
While it is interesting to compare means and individual scores across different ac-
tor types, this kind of approach does not provide us with a measure of uncertainty—
for example, to take into account that we have more responses for some actor types
14It should be noted that there is a very real possibility of bias in the sample, as respondents
were not randomly selected but rather self-selected into the sample. It some cases, the decision
of whether or not to participate in the consultation may correlate with the type of response given.
For example, companies that oppose a new directive may let their business associations speak for
them, while those who hold more favorable views decide to respond themselves.
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United Kingdom 29 59.41
EU-wide 29 52.96
Other EU 21 60.24
Other non-EU 9 78.11
Total 192 64.17
than for others—nor does it allow us to assess the relative impact of both actor type
and country of origin.
Another approach, then, is to use linear regression analysis as a tool to esti-
mate the effect of both actor type and country of origin on respondents’ overall
scores, and to generate predicted scores with confidence intervals for each actor
type. Results from such a linear model are presented in Table 5.6.
With respect to country of origin, we see that even after controlling for actor
type, German respondents are far more likely to oppose the new directive, while
French respondents are likely to support it. Respondents from the UK lie some-
where in the middle, though closer to German respondents on average. With re-
spect to actor type, we see again a clear distinction between business associations,
which are far more likely to oppose the directive, and NGOs, standard setters, and
trade unions, which are overwhelmingly supportive. Altogether these two sets of
variables—actor type and country of origin—explain 47.1% of the variance across
all response scores.
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Table 5.5: Mean score by actor type
Actor Type N Mean Examples
Accountants/Auditors 19 60.63 Ernst & Young, PwC, Deloitte
Business Associations 42 39.67 BusinessEurope, MEDEF, CBI
Companies 30 59.27 Carrefour, LaFarge, Siemens
Investors 15 68.67 AXA, EFFAS, Thomson Reuters
NGOs 40 85.60 Eurosif, Transparency International
Public Authorities 12 54.92 Polish Ministry of Finance, UK BIS
Standard Setters 7 87.86 CDP, GRI, Vigeo
Trade Unions 4 87.75 CFTD, DGB, ETUC
Other Users 23 71.57 Academics and anonymous users
Total 192 64.17
The findings appear in a more intuitive fashion in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.
Here the results of the linear model are used to generate a predicted score for each
country and actor type. The estimated score is presented within a 95% confidence
interval, showing the uncertainty we have surrounding each prediction. Over-
lapping confidence intervals between two countries or actor types indicate that
we cannot say with 95% confidence that the predicted scores are different, as is
the case with Germany and the UK in Figure 5.3, and accountants/auditors and
companies in Figure 5.4. In cases where confidence intervals do not overlap, for
example in the case of Germany and France in Figure 5.3, or business associations
and NGOs in Figure 5.4, we can be confident that the predicted scores are in fact
different from one another. In this case, we can be confident that French respon-
dents have higher predicted scores on average compared to Germany and the UK,
and that business associations have lower predicted scores than almost all actor
types, including accountants/auditors, investors, and individual companies.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All All Business Companies
Actors Actors Actors Associations
Country
Germany -31.304*** -35.248*** -56.844*** -43.500***
(5.423) (6.240) (8.973) (12.957)
Italy -6.333 -9.764 -21.444 -12.833
(8.188) (9.510) (15.267) (16.949)
Netherlands -4.568 8.181 16.500
(8.573) (9.997) (26.554)
Spain -4.911 2.912 13.556 1.500
(7.053) (8.191) (20.586) (19.792)
United Kingdom -18.407*** -17.905*** -20.944* -18.750
(5.359) (6.172) (11.736) (15.331)
EU-wide -22.999*** -24.355*** -34.354*** -18.000
(5.477) (6.240) (8.778) (19.792)
Other EU -15.822*** -17.081** -21.694* 12.500
(5.959) (6.861) (11.736) (19.792)
Other non-EU -0.975 0.792 21.556 -47.500*










Public Authorities -31.475*** -30.683***
(7.490) (7.954)
Standard Setters -4.506 2.257
(9.183) (9.901)
Trade Unions 3.484 2.150
(11.645) (12.673)
Other Users -19.410*** -14.035**
(5.868) (6.324)
Constant 99.070*** 77.319*** 85.600*** 66.444*** 74.500***
(4.725) (3.813) (3.821) (6.510) (8.851)
Observations 192 192 192 42 30
R-squared 0.471 0.219 0.333 0.611 0.470
Table 5.6: Linear regression results. DV = Public consultation response score from
principal component analysis. Reference category for Actor Type is “NGO”; refer-
ence category for Country is “France.” Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
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Figure 5.3: Linear prediction of response score by country, with 95% confidence
intervals. Based on Model 1 in Table 5.6.
5.4 Discussion
Recent reports of the policymaking process leading up to the EU’s new NFR di-
rective focus largely on battles between individual member states, as each sought
to shape the directive in the image of its own domestic policy.15 The results pre-
sented here validate this view and indicate that the battle lines were drawn as
early as 2011, when the public consultation took place. The French government
passed two rounds of comprehensive legislation mandating NFR, far more than
any other member state. In turn, we see that French respondents were far more fa-
vorable toward the prospect of new EU regulation during the consultation period.
Germany, on the other hand, has never required its companies—many of which
15Daniel Kinderman, “The Politics of Corporate Transparency and the Struggles over the Non-
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Figure 5.4: Linear prediction of response score by actor type, with 95% confidence
intervals. Based on Model 1 in Table 5.6.
of small and medium-sized firms—to report on non-financial issues, and in turn
German respondents are the most apprehensive toward a new EU directive.
Also conforming to expectations, the United Kingdom falls somewhere in be-
tween. Just as Gordon Brown reneged on his commitment to the Operating and
Financial Review, resulting in a less onerous requirement for British companies,
David Cameron reportedly insisted on restricting coverage of the EU directive to
only listed companies with more than 500 employees. That request, which pre-
vailed, reduced the scope of the directive from 18,000 to 6,000 companies across
the European Union. Overall, reports indicate that the while the UK was not op-
posed to the new directive, its officials did not do much to help either. Similarly,
in the public consultation, we find that respondents from the UK were slightly
more supportive than than those from Germany on average, though not by a wide
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enough margin for the difference in predicted values to be statistically significant.
Perhaps more importantly, results from this analysis also suggest that divisions
across sectors also help account for the success of the NFR directive. While NGOs,
standard setters, and labor unions were clearly in favor of new EU regulation in
this case, other groups of actors appear to have been open to the idea as well.
In particular, we see that accountants, auditors, investors, and individual compa-
nies all were likely to view the directive more favorably than the average business
association. While sectoral divisions have not received as much attention as the
divisions across Member States, both follow a similar logic. Just as each member
state looked to protect its own interests by steering the directive in the direction of
its own domestic policy, it is likely that many different types of organizations were
able to identify their own interests based on their experience with existing forms of
NFR regulation, both mandatory and voluntary. Though more work must be done
in this area, this analysis has shown that attitudes toward the EU’s NFR directive
vary by actor type, and that these differences map very closely to how each type
of actor functions in the governance network.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Although non-financial reporting is already common practice among the world’s
largest corporations, it is still in a relatively nascent stage of development. As a
result, its precise purpose as well as the framework proposed for its implementa-
tion are constantly evolving through cooperation and contestation among public
and private actors from all corners of the global economy. However, the recent
movement toward mandatory reporting in Europe has hastened the process of
institutionalization. As policymakers both at the national and EU level look to
transnational private regulators for expertise and legitimacy in the crafting of new
government regulation, collaboration between these various, and once competing,
private actors has increased as well. The result is a growing coalescence of sup-
port behind newly established rules and frameworks that is likely to influence the
behavior of companies, governments, and other organizations across the world.
The rise of non-financial reporting, as with CSR in general, is often associated
with the rise of neoliberalism and the erosion of institutionalized forms of social
solidarity in Europe. Although the absence of effective public policy is key to the
rise of private regulation, this research paints a somewhat different picture by illus-
trating how private actors can use voluntary standards and frameworks to bring
government into policy domains that have been left vacant as a result of neoliber-
alism. That said, neoliberal rhetoric can be a powerful tool, and it is partly though
their use of this tool that private regulatory organizations have been able to secure
117
the support not only of business but of government as well. Still, while private reg-
ulation may lay the groundwork for new public policy in some cases, its reliance
upon voluntary self- regulation also raises questions about corporate influence in
processes and discussions that are largely hidden from public view (Culpepper
2011).
Before concluding the dissertation, this chapter turns our attention to four top-
ics worthy of additional attention by researchers in this field.
6.1 The global diffusion of NFR regulation
As demonstrated by Figure 6.1, Europe has become a global leader when it comes
to the private regulation of corporate non-financial reporting. No other region has
even half the number of United Nations Global Compact members, for example.
That said, while Europe is far ahead of the rest of the world in terms of corporate
transparency, other regions are beginning to catch up. In part, this is because Eu-
ropean states have taken an active role in legitimating and endorsing compliance
with private standards worldwide.1 Perhaps the most prominent example of these
efforts came in June 2012, during discussions at the United Nations Conference on
Sustainable Development (“Rio+20”). The conference included considerable de-
bate on the subject of corporate non-financial reporting, ultimately resulting in a
carefully worded paragraph—Paragraph 47 of the Outcome Document, The Future
We Want:2
We acknowledge the importance of corporate sustainability reporting,
and encourage companies, where appropriate, especially publicly listed
1World Bank, “Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibility: Taking
Stock,” January 2004.
2United Nations, “The Future We Want,” July 2012.
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and large companies, to consider integrating sustainability information
into their reporting cycle. We encourage industry, interested govern-
ments and relevant stakeholders, with the support of the United Na-
tions system, as appropriate, to develop models for best practice and
facilitate action for the integration of sustainability reporting, taking
into account experiences from already existing frameworks and paying
particular attention to the needs of developing countries, including for
capacity building. [Paragraph 47]
A great deal of compromise went into producing this paragraph, and following the
conference, the governments of Brazil, Denmark, France and South Africa formed
a new state-led initiative called “Friends of Paragraph 47” aimed at promoting
non-financial reporting through policy and regulation—the governments of Aus-
tria, Colombia, Norway, and Switzerland have since joined the group.
These kind of developments suggest that what we have observed in Europe
may be a foreshadowing of events to come in other regions of the world. Corporate
non-financial reporting has already become mandatory by law in Indonesia and
Malaysia, for example, and it is required by stock exchanges in Brazil and South
Africa. As the number of voluntary disclosures continue to rise in these and other
countries, Europe’s recent history suggests that the breadth and scope of these
regulations will only continue to grow. While the global diffusion of NFR suggests
that the dynamics observed in Europe between private and public regulation are
not restricted to a particular geographic setting, it may still be true that Europe
is particularly well-suited to play the role of a global standard-setter and norm-
diffuser. Much of the CSR industry continues to be based in European cities, for
example, despite the wide geographic reach of many CSR initiatives. This makes
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Figure 6.1: Regional trends in corporate non-financial reporting.
Europe a particularly interesting place today for anticipating the direction of future
business regulation.
6.2 The role of the consumer
Although the research presented here indicates that firms’ voluntary NFR practices
are driven mostly by the behavior of NGOs, non-financial analysts, and investors,
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one may wonder about the role of the consumer in all of this. If the goal of CSR is to
use market mechanisms to improve corporate social and environmental behavior,
it is curious that a firm’s own customers would receive scarcely any mention in a
project such as this one. And yet the explanation is simple: the role of the consumer
hardly ever comes up in discussions about CSR. While many managers believe that
current or prospective employees will take the time to read about their social and
environmental performance, very few think the average consumer will do so. To
the extent that this is true, should consumers be held responsible somehow for not
doing more to act on their own social and environmental preferences?
From the lack of work in this area, one might conclude that many political sci-
entists would rather focus their attention at the level of institutions, and the select
group of political and economic actors that create and shape them. Perhaps some
feel that it is the responsibility of business managers and public policymakers to
ensure that companies are not exploiting their workers or polluting the environ-
ment, and that the average consumer should not be expected to play a greater role
in these matters. Still, the power that consumers have when acting collectively (see
Trumbull 2012) gives one the impression of a missed opportunity. Reich (2007, p.
120) puts a more provocative spin on this point, claiming that “. . . we have met the
enemy and it is us.” While that may be taking the argument too far, it does appear
that more attention ought to be paid to the ways in which consumers can or should
contribute to the continued development of CSR.
6.3 Business power and the threat of private regulatory capture
If we are to take CSR seriously as a form of regulation, then we also need to con-
sider how the process of forming voluntary rules and frameworks can be corrupted
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by different social actors at various points in the regulatory process. It is worth not-
ing here the many differences one might observe here between private and public
forms of regulation. While some countries require lobbyists to register with the
government before reaching out to policymakers, for example, such a basic level
of transparency is rarely achieved in the development of voluntary standards. As
noted in Chapter 2, several of the companies interviewed for this project said that
they attempted to influence the development of the GRI guidelines just as they
would in the case of state regulation. This may at times play to the advantage of
an organization like the GRI, as Chapter 5 demonstrates that individual firms who
decide to become more involved in the regulatory process are likely to have a more
supportive view of NFR. That said, the organizations that represent business as a
whole tend to have a far more critical perspective on these developments, and they
have attempted to exert pressure through the GRI’s multi-stakeholder process as
well.
The point here is simply that while civil society organizations have succeeded
in expanding the boundaries of the regulatory space in this case, they have done
so without many of the protections that exist in the realm of public policy. Al-
though the freedom to act independently has allowed private regulators to exper-
iment with new ideas and standards, the lack of formal rules in this area creates
an opportunity for “private regulatory capture” that could undermine their own
legitimacy and efficacy. Private regulation is itself a largely unregulated field.
6.4 The case for corporate non-financial reporting
Returning to the specific case of corporate non-financial reporting, many would
argue that the most important question is not what is regulated, or by whom, but
122
does it actually make a difference? That is, does corporate social and environmental
performance improve as a result of these disclosures?
Although the impact of CSR on social and environmental outcomes is perhaps
the most important question in this area of research, it is also one of the most
difficult to answer. In part, this is because researchers often lack detailed and com-
parable information about what companies are doing. Ironically, this is part of
the reason academics have become so interested in corporate non-financial report-
ing. Although case study research may be able to demonstrate positive outcomes
with respect to particular companies, it is often not possible to obtain the kind of
quantitative data one would need to perform similar tests on a wider sample of
firms.
The question of impact is further complicated by the variety of causal pathways
by which NFR could make a difference. For some companies, the benefit comes
not from disclosure per se, but from the experience of getting to know themselves
through the process of disclosure. The process of collecting non-financial data cre-
ates benchmarks that companies can use to track their own progress over time, or,
potentially, to draw comparisons with their peers. The process of reporting also
empowers managers within the firm who would like their company to take social
and environmental issues more seriously, in a sense embedding small NGO-like
groups within the firm. Other companies refer to NFR as a “learning process” that
opens a dialogue with an increasingly concerned and sophisticated group of ex-
ternal stakeholders, including investors, analysts, and activists. Of course, by dis-
closing information, companies are also making themselves accountable to these
individuals and organizations, as well as to the public at large.
While some companies see many upsides to non-financial reporting, others are
far more skeptical. Many managers, for instance, point out that while they agree
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with the idea of reporting, they find many faults in its implementation. It is a
constant source of frustration that so many companies with poor performance still
manage to do well in the various CSR rankings and ratings. Although not directly
related to non-financial disclosure, the shadow of Enron continues to hang over
all efforts to improve corporate conduct through transparency. Although claims of
greenwash do not ring as true today as they did a decade or more ago, as more
managers anticipate a critical audience for their disclosures, the omission of par-
ticular subjects, like tax havens, continues to be a problem.
Still, at a structural or systemic level, one can look at the development of non-
financial reporting over the past two decades as part of a gradual change in ex-
pectations about large corporations and their role in society. One private regulator
noted that it matters how CEOs and other managers speak about social and envi-
ronmental issues. Having the CEO on board “empowers people further down the





TABLE 1: CATEGORIES AND ASPECTS IN THE GUIDELINES
Category Economic Environmental
Aspects III   Economic Performance
  Market Presence
  Indirect Economic Impacts






  Effluents and Waste




  Supplier Environmental Assessment




Labor Practices and 
Decent Work
Human Rights Society Product Responsibility
Aspects III   Employment
  Labor/Management 
Relations
  Occupational Health 
and Safety
  Training and Education
  Diversity and Equal 
Opportunity
  Equal Remuneration for 
Women and Men
  Supplier Assessment for 
Labor Practices




  Freedom of Association 
and Collective 
Bargaining
  Child Labor
  Forced or Compulsory 
Labor
  Security Practices
  Indigenous Rights
  Assessment
  Supplier Human Rights 
Assessment
  Human Rights 
Grievance Mechanisms
   Local Communities 
  Anti-corruption
  Public Policy
  Anti-competitive 
Behavior
  Compliance
  Supplier Assessment for 
Impacts on Society
  Grievance Mechanisms 
for Impacts on Society
  Customer Health and 
Safety
  Product and Service 
Labeling
  Marketing 
Communications
  Customer Privacy
  Compliance
2.3 REQUEST FOR NOTIFICATION OF USE
Organizations that have prepared a sustainability report are requested to notify GRI upon release of the 
report, if:
  The report is ‘in accordance’ with the Guidelines – Core or Comprehensive option
  The report contains Standard Disclosure(s) from the Guidelines but has not fulfilled all the requirements of 
either ‘in accordance’ option
When notifying GRI, organizations can choose either or both of the following options:
  Notify GRI of the report and provide hard and/or soft copy
  Register the report in GRI’s Sustainability Disclosure Database: database.globalreporting.org
III   The word topic is used in the Guidelines to refer to any possible sustainability subject. The word Aspect is used in the Guidelines to refer to the list of 
subjects covered by the Guidelines.
Figure A.1: Topics covered by the Global Reporting Initiative’s G4 Sustainability
Reporting Guidelines.
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Indicators linking to our strategy and 2016 remuneration
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a This represents reported incidents occurring within BP’s 
operational HSSE reporting boundary. That boundary 
includes BP’s own operated facilities and certain other 
locations or situations.
b DAFWCF and RIF are the annual frequency per 200,000 
hours worked. 
c We report tier 1 process safety events, which are losses of 
primary containment of greatest consequence – causing 
harm to a member of the workforce, costly damage to 
equipment or exceeding defined quantities. Tier 2 events are 
those of lesser consequence. 
d Loss of primary containment is the number of unplanned or 
uncontrolled releases of oil, gas, or other hazardous materials 
from a tank, vessel, pipe, railcar or other equipment used 
for containment or transfer. Figures for 2014 to 2016 include 
increased reporting due to the introduction of enhanced 
automated monitoring for remote sites in our US Lower 48 
business. Using a like-for-like approach with previous years’ 
reporting, our LOPC figure is 233 (2015 208, 2014 246).
e Oil spills are defined as any liquid hydrocarbon release of 
more than, or equal to, one barrel (159 litres, equivalent to  
42 US gallons). 
f We provide data on GHG emissions material to our 
businesses on a carbon dioxide-equivalent basis. This 
includes CO2 and methane for direct emissions. This 
encompasses all BP’s consolidated entities as well as  
our share of equity-accounted entities other than  
BP’s share of TNK-BP and Rosneft for the relevant periods. 
g The reported 2015 figure has been amended from 45.0.
h The reported 2014 figure has been amended from 48.6.
i The reported 2015 figure has been amended from 48.9.
j  Indirect emissions are associated with the purchase of 
electricity, heat, steam or cooling into our operations.
Our performance
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Direct carbon dioxide (CO2) (million tonnes (Mte)) 56.4 47.0 45.5 45.1g 46.1
Direct methane (Mte) 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
Direct greenhouse gas (GHG) (MteCO2 equivalent (CO2e)) 59.8 50.3 48.7h 49.0i 50.1
Indirect carbon dioxide (CO2)j (Mte) 8.4 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.2
Real sustainable reductions in GHG emissionsk (Mte) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3
Greenhouse gas intensity (TeCO2 equivalent/unit)
Upstream (per thousand barrels of oil equivalent) 29.2 30.1 32.0l 32.7m 34.7
Refining (per utilized equivalent distillation capacity) 901 995 978 944 951
Petrochemicals (per thousand tonnes) 293 283 291 290 287
Flaringn (upstream) (thousand tonnes (kte) of hydrocarbons) 1,548 2,028 2,188 1,863 1,896
Customer emissionso (MteCO2) 517 422 406 402 395
Carbon dioxide avoided through our renewables businessp (MteCO2e) 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.1
Greenhouse gas emissions f
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Fatalities – employees 1 4 0 0 0
Fatalities – contractors 3 2 3 1 3
Day away from work cases – workforce 152 130 145 108 94
Day away from work case frequencyb (DAFWCF) – workforce 0.076 0.070 0.081 0.061 0.051
Recordable injuries – workforce 710 578 547 428 385 
Recordable injury frequencyb (RIF) – workforce 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.21
Tier 1 process safety eventsc (number) 43 20 28 20 16
Tier 2 process safety eventsc (number) 154 110 95 83 84
Losses of primary containmentd (number) 292 261 286 235 275
Oil spillse – number (> one barrel) 204 185 156 146 149
 Oil spills contained 102 111 93 91 91
 Oil spills reaching land and water 102 74 63 55 58
Oil spills – volume (million litres) 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.7
 Oil unrecovered (million litres) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3
Safety a















Loss of primary containmentad
 233 
Figure A.2: Excerpt from BP’s 2016 non-financial report, demonstrating the use of
key performance indicators (KPIs).
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OUR APPROACH OUR SUSTAINABILITY CONTEXT
OUR SUSTAINABILITY 
CONTEXT
There are several definitions of sustainable 
development that are influenced by personal, 
social, institutional and geographic contexts. 
At Anglo American, we use the ISO 26000 Guidance on 
Social Responsibility, which draws on the well-known 
‘Brundtland definition’ (Our Common Future; 1987): 
“Sustainable development is development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable 
development is about integrating the goals of a high 
quality of life, health and prosperity with social justice 
and maintaining the earth’s capacity to support life in all 
its diversity. These social, economic and environmental 
goals are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”
To give practical application to sustainable development, 
Anglo American has for many years used the ‘capitals 
model’, which highlights that an organisation’s ability to 
create value for itself is inextricably linked to the value it 
creates for others, and to the impacts it has on society and 
the environment. ‘Capitals thinking’ has been used to inform 
Anglo American’s business model. (See page 11.) 
MINING AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Sustainable development in the mining industry is shaped 
by a number of characteristics that are unique to the sector. 
Mining is long term, yet finite
While the life of a mine can range from 10 to more than 
a hundred years, the resource will eventually become 
depleted or economically unviable. The inevitable closure 
of mining operations means that maximum value must 
be delivered over that period, and in such a way that 
the immediate needs and expectations of employees, 
governments and communities are balanced with those of 
future generations. Ensuring that at the end of the life of 
each mine the host community is able to prosper and 
that bio-physical closure is completed to a satisfactory 
level, is crucial. 
Mines are located where resources are found
As an extractor of natural resources, the location of mining 
operations is dictated by where mineral resources are found. 
Mining companies cannot simply move their operations if 
local conditions are, or become, unfavourable. While capital 
can be refocused over time to more attractive locations and/
or commodities, mining projects require substantial up-front 
capital investment. This can run counter to and limit 
companies’ appetite to respond to short term social, political 
and economic shocks. Being committed to long term 
business decisions has benefits and challenges: approaches 
to sustainability can be more strategic if considered within a 
particular area over a long time frame; but regulators are 
able to make more assertive policy decisions than they 
could with other sectors.
In contrast with most other industries, mining companies’ 
main source of revenue is ‘owned’ by host countries. For 
this reason, and because many mining operations are 
located in areas that have little other economic activity, 
there is an expectation that the industry acts as a catalyst 
for socio-economic development. 
Finally, reserves that are easy to exploit have largely  
been found and mined. This reality inevitably steers the 
future of mining towards more environmentally, politically 
and technically challenging reserves and/or locations. 
Herein lie obvious challenges, but also opportunities for 
companies that can demonstrate a track record of technical 
excellence, sustainability best practice and an ability to 
navigate complexity.
Visible environmental impacts
Mining activities have a material environmental impact. 
The change from the baseline land-use associated with 
mining is currently unavoidable and difficult to remediate 
effectively, particularly in the short term. These highly visible 
disruptions to land make mining a natural focus for those 
concerned about the health of our environment. 
The majority of environmental impacts associated with 
mining are felt by local communities, who often depend 
on ecosystem services to sustain their livelihoods. In some 
cases, the initial and ongoing environmental effects of 
mining (sanctioned or otherwise) have the ability to 
undermine the considerable efforts being made by mining 
companies to enhance socio-economic benefits. 
Safety, health and employee relations
The labour-intensive nature of mining, combined 
with physical hazards inherent to the industry, present 
higher risks to human health and safety than many 
other sectors. Historically, these issues were not always 
effectively managed by the industry and have resulted in  
a negative legacy that has not yet been fully overcome – 
despite safety and health today being top of mind for 
responsible companies.
The industry is also particularly exposed to labour relations 
risks, especially in developing economies with high levels 
of unemployment. 
Direct link to sustainability
Socially responsible investors have a special interest in 
mining because of the more direct relationship between 
sustainability issues, licence to operate and financial 
performance. Despite this (and with the exception 
of De Beers) consumer activism has not yet gained 
significant traction in the industry: many consumers do  
not connect the use of everyday products to mining. In 
cases where such concerns have been raised, tracking 
minerals used in products to a particular company or 
country has proven problematic, and there is limited  
scope for product substitution. 
Figure A.3: Excerpt from Anglo American’s 2016 non-financial report, demonstrat-
ing the use of narrative reporting.
127
64 Ericsson | Sustainability and Corporate Responsibility Report 2016
gri index
The Standard Disclosure Items listed below have been externally assured (Assurance Statement p.68). Disclosure of Management Approach (DMA) cov-
ering identified significant issues can be found online. Omissions to Standard Disclosure Items are described, when applicable, in GRI Disclosure 2016 
online. Standard Disclosure Items listed are an indicative description. For a full Standard Disclosure Items description please visit GRI Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines.
GRI Standard Disclosure Items Reference Status
STRATEGY AND ANALYSIS





G4-03 Name of the organization GRI
G4-04 Primary brands, products, and/or services AR p. 6-23
G4-05 Location of organization's headquarters AR p.184
G4-06 Countries where the organization operates AR p.24-25
G4-07 Nature of ownership and legal form AR p.136
G4-08 Markets served AR p.24–25
G4-09 Scale of the organization AR p.ii
G4-10 Total workforce AR p.94-95
G4-11 Collective bargaining agreements coverage GRI
G4-12 Organization's supply chain description AR p.48
G4-13 Significant changes during the reporting period AR p.1
G4-14 Precautionary approach application by the organiza-
tion
GRI
G4-15 Commitment to external economic,  
environmental and social principles or initiatives
GRI
G4-16 Memberships of associations and national  
or international advocacy
GRI
IDENTIFIED MATERIAL ASPECTS AND BOUNDARIES








G4-19 Material aspects identified in the process for defining 
the report content 
S&CR  
p.12–13
G4-20 Aspect boundary within the organization
for each material aspect
GRI
G4-21 Aspect boundary outside the organization
for each material aspect
GRI
G4-22 Effect of any re-statements of information
provided in earlier reports
GRI
G4-23 Significant changes from previous reporting periods  
in the scope and aspect boundary
GRI
STAKEHOLDERS ENGAGEMENTS
G4-24 Stakeholder groups engaged by the organization S&CR p.10
G4-25 Basis for identification and selection of stakeholders 
with whom to engage
S&CR p.10
G4-26 Organization’s approach to stakeholder engagement S&CR p.10
G4-27 Key topics and concerns raised through stakeholder 




G4-28 Reporting period for information provided S&CR p.i
G4-29 Date of most recent previous report GRI
G4-30 Reporting cycle GRI
G4-31 Provide the contact point for questions regarding  
the report
S&CR p.61
G4-32 GRI Content Index and ‘in accordance’ option S&CR  
p.i, 64-65
G4-33 Organization's policy and practice with regard of 
 external assurance for the report
S&CR p.68
GRI Standard Disclosure Items Reference Status
GOVERNANCE
G4-34 Governance structure of the organization AR  
p.134–161
ETHICS AND INTEGRITY
G4-56 Organization's values, principles, standards  
and norms of behavior
GRI
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
EC 02 Risks and opportunities due to climate change AR p.48-49 
S&CR p.47-48
EC 04 Financial assistance received  
by the organization from governments.
GRI




EC 09 Percentage of the procurement budget used for 
 significant locations of operation spent on suppliers 




EN 01 Materials used by weight or volume GRI
EN 03 Energy consumption within the organization S&CR p.41-42
EN 04 Energy consumption outside of the organization S&CR p.42
EN 06 Reduction of energy consumption S&CR  
p.41-42




EN 08 Total water withdrawal by source GRI
EN 15 Direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Scope 1) S&CR p.42
EN 16 Energy indirect greenhouse gas (GHG)  
emissions (Scope 2)
 S&CR p.42
EN 17 Other indirect greenhouse gas (GHG)  
emissions (Scope 3)
S&CR p.42
EN 18 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensity S&CR p.41
EN 19 Reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions S&CR  
p.41-42
EN 21 NOX, SOX, and other significant air emissions GRI
EN 27 Impact mitigation of environmental impacts  
of products and services
GRI
EN 32 Percentage of new suppliers that were screened  
using environmental criteria
GRI
EN 34 Number of grievances about environmental impacts 
filed, addressed, and resolved through formal  
grievance mechanisms
GRI
Figure A.4: Excerpt from Ericsson’s 2016 non-financial report, showing the first
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HOW NOVO NORDISK CREATES 
AND SUSTAINS VALUE
Taking a patient-centred approach, Novo Nordisk provides innovation for the benefit of all of 
the company’s stakeholders. The Triple Bottom Line principle, anchored in the Novo Nordisk 
Way, is the foundation that makes it possible to optimise the use of resources and maximise 
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Figure A.5: Excerpt from Novo Nordisk’s 2016 non-financial report, demonstrating




2 Societal, Social and Environmental InformationVerifi cation of Non-Financial Data
4.2. Report of the Statutory Auditor Designated as an Independent 
Third Party on the Consolidated Societal, Social and Environmental 
Information Presented in the Management Report
In our capacity as Statutory Auditors of Vivendi designated as 
an independent third party and accredited by COFRAC   (1) under 
number 3-1065, we hereby present our report on the consolidated 
societal, social and environmental information for the year ended 
December 31, 2016, presented in the management report (hereinafter 
“CSR information”), pursuant to the provisions of Article L.225-102-1 of 
the French Commercial Code (Code de commerce).
Responsibility of the Company
It is the responsibility of the Management Board to prepare a management 
report that includes the CSR information referred to in Article R.225-105-1 
of the French Commercial Code, in accordance with the guidelines used 
by the company in its “Reporting Protocol for Environmental, Social and 
Societal Data of the Vivendi Group Companies – 2016” (hereinafter “the 
Guidelines”), a summary of which is included in Chapter 2, Section 4.1 of 
the management report and which is available on request.
Independence and Quality Control
Our independence is defined by regulatory texts, the Code of Ethics 
of our profession, and the provisions of Article L.822-11 of the French 
Commercial Code. We have also implemented a quality control system 
that includes documented policies and procedures intended to ensure 
compliance with ethical standards, professional standards and applicable 
laws and regulations.
Responsibility of the Independent Statutory Auditor
Based on our work, it is our role:
 ◆ to attest that the required CSR information is presented in the 
management report or that, in the event of non-disclosure, an 
explanation has been provided in accordance with Article R.225-105, 
paragraph  3, of the French Commercial Code (Statement of 
Completeness of CSR information); and
 ◆ to express limited assurance that, taken as a whole, the CSR Information 
is presented fairly in all material aspects in accordance with the 
Guidelines (Opinion on the fair presentation of CSR information).
Our work was undertaken by a team of fi ve people between October 2016 
and February 2017 over a period of around 12 weeks. We were assisted 
by our specialists in Corporate Social Responsibility.
We conducted the work described below in accordance with professional 
auditing standards applicable in France, with the Order of May 13, 2013 
which sets the conditions under which an independent third party should 
carry out their work and, concerning our opinion on the fair presentation 
of CSR information, in accordance with international standard 
ISAE 3000 (2).
1. STATEMENT OF COMPLETENESS 
OF CSR INFORMATION
Nature and scope of work
Based on interviews with the management of the relevant departments, 
we reviewed the company’s sustainable development strategy with 
respect to the social and environmental impact of its activities and 
its societal commitments, and, where appropriate, any initiatives or 
programs implemented as a result.
We compared the CSR information presented in the management report 
with the list provided in Article R.225-105-1 of the French Commercial Code.
For any consolidated information that was not disclosed, we verified 
that the explanations provided complied with the provisions of Article 
R.225-105, paragraph 3, of the French Commercial Code.
We verifi ed that the CSR information covered the consolidated scope, 
namely the company and its subsidiaries as defi ned by Article L.233-1 
of the French Commercial Code, and the entities which it controls as 
defi ned by Article L.233-3 of the French Commercial Code, within the 
limitations specifi ed in the note on methodology in Chapter 2, Section 4.1 
of the management report.
Conclusion
Based on this work, and in consideration of the limitations mentioned 
above, we attest that the required CSR information is present in the 
management report.
2. REASONED OPINION ON THE FAIRNESS 
OF CSR INFORMATION
Nature and scope of work
We conducted six interviews at the consolidated entity level with 
the persons responsible for preparing the CSR information in the CSR 
and Human Resources departments, with those in charge of the data 
collection process and, where applicable, with the persons responsible 
for internal control and risk management procedures, in order to:
 ◆ assess the suitability of the Guidelines for reporting in terms 
of their relevance, completeness, reliability, impartiality, and 
understandability, taking into account best practice where 
appropriate; and
(1) Accreditation scope available on www.cofrac.fr.
(2) ISAE 3000 – Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information.
This is a free translation into English of the original Statutory Auditors’ Report in French and is provided solely for the convenience of English-speaking 
users. This report should be read in conjunction with, and construed in accordance with, French law and professional standards applicable in France.
To the shareholders,
Figure A.6: Excerpt from Vivendi’s 2016 non-financial report, showing the first
page of Ernst & Young’s third-party verification.
Appendix B
Interviews
Fieldwork for this project consisted of four main rounds of interviews, beginning
with a preliminary set of meetings in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
during the summer of 2011. This round was completed prior to the defense of the
dissertation prospectus and consisted of semi-structured interviews with 9 compa-
nies, 4 NGOs, and 9 academic experts.1 A second round of interviews took place
in the UK during the spring of 2012. This included meetings with the Carbon Dis-
closure Project, Business in the Community, EIRIS, and the FTSE Group. A third
round of interviews took place in France, Sweden, and the UK in the spring of
2013. The final round of interviews took place in Brussels in the fall of 2014. In
addition to these four main rounds of interviews, a number of additional inter-
views were conducted on an ad hoc basis. Table B.1 provides a complete list of the
interviews conducted for this project (not including conversations with academic
experts). Semi-structured interviews with corporate managers were based on the
list of questions in Table B.2.
1Academic experts consulted during this trip include Jeremy Moon and Christian Herzig at the
University of Nottingham, N. Craig Smith and David Ronnegard at INSEAD, Niklas Zande´n at
the University of Gothenburg, and Itziar Castello and Steen Vallentin at the Copenhagen Business
School. I was also able to fortunate to meet with David Vogel (University of California, Berkeley)
and Ed Freeman (University of Virginia), who happened to be traveling abroad during this period.
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Organization Country Date
Government & Multilateral Organizations
UN Principles for Responsible Investment United Kingdom 5/18/2012
UN Global Compact United States 5/31/2013
European Commission Belgium 11/28/2014
NGOs
Tellus Institute United States 3/12/2011
CSR International United Kingdom 5/23/2011
CSR Greenland Denmark 6/16/2011
Swedwatch Sweden 6/20/2011
Fair Trade Center Sweden 6/22/2011
Global Reporting Initiative Netherlands 5/4/2012
Carbon Disclosure Project United Kingdom 5/11/2012
Initiative for Responsible Investment United States 10/1/2012
Global e-Sustainability Initiative Belgium 4/26/2013
Transparency International Belgium 11/26/2014
European Coalition for Corporate Justice Belgium 12/3/2014
LobbyControl Germany 12/9/2015
Forest Stewardship Council Germany 12/18/2015
Ratings Agencies
Business in the Community United Kingdom 3/14/2013
EIRIS United Kingdom 5/21/2012




European Trade Union Confederation Belgium 12/5/2014
Business Associations




GDF Suez France 5/27/2011
Lafarge France 5/31/2011
Sanofi France 6/28/2011
Pernod Ricard France 4/2/2013
SNCF France 4/3/2013
Suez Environment France 4/3/2013
Veolia Environment France 4/11/2013
ADP France 4/15/2013
Total France 4/18/2013
Credit Agricole France 4/18/2013
BNP Paribas France 4/23/2013
Alcatel-Lucent France 4/24/2013
BPCE France 4/29/2013
Schneider Electric France 5/31/2013
Companies — Sweden
Atlas Copco Sweden 6/20/2011
Swedish Steel (SSAB) Sweden 6/21/2011
Boliden Sweden 6/23/2011
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Sony Mobile Communications Sweden 6/27/2011






Companies — United Kingdom
Cadbury United Kingdom 4/25/2012
Marks & Spencer United Kingdom 5/9/2012
National Grid United Kingdom 2/27/2013
The Go-Ahead Group United Kingdom 3/7/2013
Daily Mail & General Trust United Kingdom 3/18/2013
Trinity Mirror United Kingdom 3/18/2013
Anglo-American United Kingdom 3/19/2013
Table B.1: Interviews conducted.
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# Question
Q1 Role—What is your role at the company?
Q2 Why?—Describe your company’s rationale for collecting and reporting
non-financial data.
Q3 How?—Describe the process of collecting and reporting non-financial
data.
Q4 Self-assessment—Describe your company’s current state of non-financial
reporting. In what areas is your company doing well? Where is there
room for improvement?
Q5 Law—How much of what you disclose is determined by legal require-
ments? What laws, if any, must you follow in this regard?
Q6 Voluntary standards—What standards (if any) do you use in the report-
ing process?
Q7 Network—What other individuals or organizations do you collaborate
with in this area?
Q8 Trend toward mandatory reporting—Do you expect that non-financial
reporting will become mandatory in the near future?
Q9 Lobbying—In what ways (if any) does your company lobby at the na-
tional or EU level regarding CSR or non-financial reporting?
Q10 Impact—Does non-financial reporting make a difference?
Table B.2: Interview questions for corporate non-financial reporting managers.
Appendix C
Multilevel and network analyses
Firm-level
CDP response. Coded 1 if a firm responds to the Carbon Disclosure Project’s
questionnaire; otherwise coded 0. Source: Carbon Disclosure Project (2016).
GC member. Coded 1 if a firm is an active business participant in the United
Nations Global Compact; otherwise coded 0. Source: United Nations Global
Compact (2016).
GRI report. Coded 1 if a firm discloses non-financial information using the
Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines; otherwise
coded 0. Source: Global Reporting Initiative (2016).
Profit margin (pct). Indicates a firm’s gross profit margin percentage. Source:
Compustat (2016).
Revenue (ln). Refers a firm’s total revenue, converted to USD and transformed
by the natural logarithm. Source: Compustat (2016).
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Sector. Refers to a firm’s industrial sector according to the Global Industry
Classification Standard, which includes the following categories: energy, ma-
terials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, fi-
nancials, informational technology, telecommunication services, and utilities.
Source: Compustat (2016).
Country-level
GDP (ln). Gross domestic product (purchasing power parity; current inter-
national dollars), transformed by the natural logarithm. Source: World Bank
(2015).
GDP growth. Annual growth in gross domestic product (purchasing power
parity; current international dollars). Source: World Bank (2015).
GDP per capita (ln). Gross domestic product per capita (purchasing power
parity; current international dollars), transformed by the natural logarithm.
Source: World Bank (2015).
Left government. Left governing party seats as a percent of all legislative seats.
Source: Swank (2013).
Mandatory NFR regulation. Coded 1 if a country has implemented manda-
tory non-financial reporting rules; otherwise coded 0. Source: KPMG et al.
(2016).
Regulatory stringency. An index focusing on regulatory restraints that limit
the freedom of exchange in credit, labor, and product markets. Scale is re-
versed to that higher values denote more regulatory restraints. Source: Fraser
Institute (2016).
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Union density. Union density rate; net union membership as a proportion of
wage earners in employment. Source: Visser (2016).
Network
Bipartite density. A basic measurement of two-mode networks, equal to the
total number of ties in a network divided the number of total possible ties in
the network. Source: Latapy, Magnien and Vecchio (2008).
Clustering (Robins and Alexander). A clustering measure equal to the ratio
of three-paths to four-cycles. Source: Robins and Alexander (2004).
Clustering (Opsahl). A clustering measure equal to ratio of five-paths to six-
cycles. Source: Opsahl (2013).
Firms. Total number of firms in the network.

































































































































● United Nations Global Compact Global Reporting Initiative Carbon Disclosure Project
Figure C.1: National trends in corporate non-financial reporting. Vertical lines
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United Nations Global Compact
Figure C.2: Change in NFR per million capita over time in France, Sweden, United











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.5: Network density and clustering by country in 2014
Country N Bipartite Clustering Clustering
Density (Robins and Alexander) (Opsahl)
Austria 49 0.136 0.555 0.263
Belgium 71 0.094 0.547 0.337
Denmark 86 0.194 0.465 0.141
Finland 88 0.292 0.724 0.485
France 321 0.219 0.720 0.523
Germany 332 0.159 0.605 0.376
Greece 49 0.184 0.282 0.019
Ireland 29 0.138 0.200 0.000
Italy 132 0.154 0.664 0.409
Netherlands 87 0.245 0.562 0.320
Poland 52 0.071 0.500 0.000
Portugal 31 0.204 0.585 0.290
Spain 83 0.325 0.678 0.464
Sweden 147 0.281 0.703 0.494
United Kingdom 486 0.189 0.365 0.147




D.1 Public consultation questions and coding
1. How would you consider the current regime of disclosure of non-financial
information applicable in your country? [Required]
• Answer choices: Very poor; Poor; Sufficient; Good; Very Good.
• Coding: Very Good = 0; Good = 1; Sufficient = 2; Poor = 3; Very poor =
4.
2. Have you evaluated the effects, and costs and benefits, of any current corpo-
rate disclosure of environmental or social information? [Required]
• Answer choices: Yes; No; No opinion.
• Coding: not included in the analysis.
3. If you think that the current regime of disclosure of non-financial information
should be improved, how do you suggest that this should be done? [Op-
tional]
• Answer choices: narrative response.
• Coding: not included in the analysis.
4. In your opinion, should companies be required to disclose the following
(check all relevant boxes): (1) CSR policy; (2) social/environmental risks and
opportunities; (3) key information regarding particular issues; (4) other. [Op-
tional]
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• Coding: Other/Missing = 0; Policy/Risks/Info = 1; Policy & Risks/Policy
& Info/Risks & Info = 2; Policy & Risks & Info = 3.
5. In your opinion, for a EU measure on reporting of non-financial informa-
tion to achieve materiality and comparability it should be based upon (check
all relevant boxes): (1) Principles; (2) Key Performance Indicators; (3) Other.
[Optional]
• Coding: Other/Missing = 0; Principles/KPIs = 1; Principles & KPIs = 2.
5a. In case you consider that Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) would be
useful, would you think that they should be (check all relevant boxes): (1)
General for all economic sectors; (2) Sector specific. [Required]
• Coding: Missing = 0; General/Sector = 1; General & Sector = 2.
6. In your opinion, what should be the process to identify relevant principles
and/or indicators (whether general or sector-specific)?
• Answer choices: narrative response.
• Coding: not included in the analysis.
7. In your opinion, should companies be required to disclose the steps they take
to fulfill the corporate responsibility to respect human rights? [Required]
• Answer choices: Yes; No; No opinion.
• Coding: No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1.
8. In your opinion, should companies be required to disclose the risks they face
and the policies they have in the field of corruption and bribery? [Required]
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• Answer choices: Yes; No; No opinion.
• Coding: No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1.
9. In your opinion, what companies should be required to disclose non-financial
information (check only one box): (1) large listed companies; (2) large com-
panies (listed and non-listed); (3) medium-sized and large listed companies;
(4) medium-sized and large companies (listed and non-listed); (5) all listed
companies (small, medium and large); (6) all listed and non-listed compa-
nies (small, medium and large); (7) None; (8) Other. [Required]
• Coding: None = 0; All other answer choices = 1.
10. In your opinion, should institutional investors be subject to specific or ad-
ditional disclosure requirements, for example to disclose whether and how
they take into account environmental and social issues into their investment
decisions? [Required]
• Answer choices: Yes; No; No opinion.
• Coding: No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1.
11. In your opinion, should European policy promote the concept of “integrated
reporting”? [Required]
• Answer choices: Yes; No; No opinion.
• Coding: No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1.
12. In your opinion, should disclosed non-financial information be audited by
external auditors? [Required]
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• Answer choices: Yes; No; No opinion.
• Coding: No/No opinion = 0; Yes = 1.
13. If you have relevant documents you want to share with us, please attach
them here.
• Coding: not included in the analysis.
D.2 List of scores by organization
Table C.1 lists the name of each respondent, score, actor type, and country.
Organization Score Actor Type Country
The Corporate Responsibility
(CORE) Coalition
100 NGOs United Kingdom
Anonymous 100 NGOs Germany
CorA 100 NGOs Germany
Friends of the Earth Cyprus 96 NGOs Cyprus
Anonymous 96 Other Users United Kingdom
CSR Insight LLC 96 Standard Setters United States
International Corporate Gover-
nance Network
96 NGOs United Kingdom
FairPensions 96 NGOs United Kingdom
Germanwatch 96 NGOs Germany
Friends of the Earth Europe 96 NGOs Belgium
Finnwatch and Kepa 96 NGOs Finland
Confederacion Sindical de Comi-
siones Obreras (CCOO)
96 Trade Unions Spain
ALOP 96 NGOs Multiple
Fondazione Lelio and Lisli Basso-
Issoco
96 Other Users Italy
Stitching Corporate Europe Obser-
vatory
96 NGOs Belgium
Anonymous 96 Investors France
Environmental Law Service 96 NGOs Czech Republic
Global Reporting Initiative 96 Standard Setters Netherlands
Economistas Sin Fronteras 96 NGOs Spain
BMJ Ratings 96 Standard Setters France
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Anonymous 96 Companies United Kingdom
United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme Finance Initiative
96 Investors Multiple
Oxfam International 96 NGOs Netherlands
European Coalition for Corporate
Justice (ECCJ)
96 NGOs Belgium
Observatorio RSC 96 NGOs Spain
European Trade Union Confedera-
tion
92 Trade Unions Multiple
ClientEarth 92 NGOs Multiple
Friends of the Earth Netherlands 92 NGOs Netherlands
Corporate Context Limited 92 Accountants/Auditors United Kingdom
CFDT 92 Trade Unions France
Federacion de Mujeres Porgresistas 92 NGOs Spain
EFFAS 92 Investors Germany
CEE Bankwatch Network 92 NGOs Czech Republic
Anonymous 92 Other Users Spain
Anonymous 92 Companies France
Centre for Research on Multina-
tional Corporations
92 NGOs Netherlands
EIRIS 92 Standard Setters United Kingdom
MSCI ESG Research 92 Standard Setters France
Credit Agricole Cheuvreux 92 Investors France
Af2i 92 Investors France
Eurosif 92 NGOs France
Anonymous 91 Companies Latvia
Anonymous 91 Companies Netherlands
CFIE-conseil 89 Other Users France
Association Francaise de la Gestion
financiere (AFG)
89 Business Associations France
CNCC 89 Accountants/Auditors France
Thomson Reuters / ASSET4 89 Investors Switzerland
Autorite des marches financiers
(AMF)
89 Public Authorities France
Anonymous 89 Companies France
The Academy of Business in Soci-
ety
88 Business Associations United Kingdom
European Baha’I Business Forum
(EBBF)
88 Business Associations Multiple
Assirevi 88 Accountants/Auditors Italy
FCRSE 88 NGOs France
Anonymous 88 Other Users Ireland
Une seule planete 88 NGOs France




Local Authority Pension Fund Fo-
rum (LAPFF)
87 Public Authorities United Kingdom
Anonymous 87 Other Users France
Andrea Bather (Waikato Manage-
ment School)
87 Other Users New Zealand
Forum pour l’Investissement Re-
sponsible (FIR)
85 NGOs France
CoopFR 85 Business Associations France
Coop de France 85 Business Associations France
AXA Group 84 Investors France
Fundacion ONCE 84 NGOs Spain
La Poste 84 Companies France
CCFD-Terre Solidaire 83 NGOs France
CNDCEC 83 Accountants/Auditors Italy
Anonymous 83 Other Users France
Anonymous 83 Companies Austria
Anonymous 83 Other Users France
Deloitte 83 Accountants/Auditors Colombia
Pirelli & C. 83 Companies Italy
Christian Schrader 82 Other Users Germany
Anonymous 82 Public Authorities Germany
ACFCI 81 Business Associations France
F&C Investments 80 Investors United Kingdom
Confederation of the Spanish Sav-
ings Banks (CECA)
80 Business Associations Spain
MAIF 80 Companies France
Federation of German Consumer
Organizations
79 NGOs Germany
Anonymous 79 Companies Belgium
Anonymous 79 Companies Germany
Anonymous 78 Other Users Sweden
Anonymous 78 Other Users France
Vigeo 77 Standard Setters France
Comite 21 77 NGOs France
Aviva PLC 77 Companies United Kingdom
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 76 Accountants/Auditors Multiple
Anonymous 76 Companies Spain
Lafarge SA 76 Companies France
Consorci Sanitari de l’Anoia 76 Other Users Spain
AlterCompany 76 Companies Spain
Sustainalytics 75 Other Users Netherlands
Transparency International 75 NGOs Belgium
Danish Consumer Council (For-
brugerradet)
75 Business Associations Denmark
Black Sun Plc 75 Other Users United Kingdom
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Clean Clothes Campaign 74 NGOs Netherlands
Diarra Sally (student) 74 Other Users France
LobbyControl E.V. 73 NGOs Germany
Business in the Community Ireland 71 NGOs Ireland
Brachet Vincent (student) 71 Other Users France
Cooperatives Europe 71 Business Associations Belgium
Enel S.p.a. 71 Companies Italy
Deutscher Gewerkschafsbund
(DGB), Bundesvorstand
71 Trade Unions Germany
Alcyone Finance 71 Investors France
BDO LLP 70 Accountants/Auditors United Kingdom
Delphis 70 NGOs France
Eumedion 68 Investors Netherlands
EDENRED 67 Companies France
Anonymous 66 Other Users Spain
Impronta Etica 66 NGOs Italy
Anonymous 66 Companies France
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 66 Standard Setters Multiple
Amnesty International 65 NGOs Multiple
Secteur des affaires sociales et du
travail (France)
64 Public Authorities France
ESH 64 Business Associations France
Anonymous 63 Other Users France
Association of Chartered Certified
Accountants (ACCA)




Association Francaise des En-
treprises Privees (AFEP)
63 Business Associations France
Chambre de commerce et
d’industrie de Paris
62 Public Authorities France
Conseil des barreaux europeens
(CCBE)
62 NGOs Belgium
Italian Banking Association (ABI) 62 Business Associations Italy
Tomorrow’s Company 62 NGOs United Kingdom
Anonymous 62 Business Associations Finland
Ecologistas en Accion 61 NGOs Spain
Aldersgate Group 61 NGOs United Kingdom
Ernst & Young 61 Accountants/Auditors United Kingdom
Bayer AG 59 Companies Germany
Federation of European Accoun-
tants (FEE)
58 Accountants/Auditors Belgium
Anonymous 57 Accountants/Auditors Sweden
MACIF 57 Business Associations France
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Commission des normes compta-
bles (CNC)
54 Public Authorities Luxembourg
The British Private Equity and Ven-
ture Capital Association
54 Business Associations United Kingdom
Ministry of Finance 54 Public Authorities Poland
European Economic Area 53 Accountants/Auditors Multiple
Instituto de Contabilidad y Audito-
ria de Cuentas (ICAC)
52 Public Authorities Spain
Institute of Chartered Accountants
of Scotland
48 Accountants/Auditors United Kingdom
Commerce and Companies Agency 46 Public Authorities Denmark
Noemie Blamoutier (student) 45 Other Users France
KPMG 45 Accountants/Auditors Multiple
Carrefour 42 Companies France
Mouvement des Entreprises de
France (MEDEF)
42 Business Associations France
CEEP 41 Business Associations Multiple
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants
41 Accountants/Auditors United States
Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 40 Accountants/Auditors United Kingdom
Ministry of Finance 37 Public Authorities Czech Republic
European Public Real Estate Asso-
ciation (EPRA)
37 Business Associations Belgium
European Association of Co-
operative Banks (EACB)
37 Business Associations Belgium
Anonymous 36 Business Associations Belgium
ATP 34 Investors Denmark
Allianz SE 34 Companies Belgium
GC100 / Practical Law 33 Other Users United Kingdom
AMICE aisbl 32 Business Associations Belgium
CSR Europe 32 Business Associations Belgium
Japan Business Council in Europe
(JBCE)
32 Business Associations Belgium
CGPME 32 Business Associations France
Anonymous 31 Companies Italy
Central Chamber of Commerce of
Finland
30 Business Associations Finland
Anonymous 30 Companies United Kingdom
Siemens AG 28 Companies Germany




Merck 27 Companies Germany
Norsk Hydro ASA 27 Companies Norway
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Department for Business, Innova-
tion & Skills (BIS)
24 Public Authorities United Kingdom
Anonymous 24 Investors Multiple
econsense 23 Business Associations Germany
WICI 21 Other Users Belgium
Association of British Insurers 20 Business Associations United Kingdom
Confederation of British Industry
(CBI)
20 Business Associations United Kingdom
Royal Dutch Shell 20 Companies United Kingdom
Chartered Financial Analyst Soci-
ety of the United Kingdom
19 Investors United Kingdom
BusinessEurope 19 Business Associations Belgium
HDE 15 Business Associations Germany
Anonymous 15 Companies Germany
ICAEW 15 Accountants/Auditors United Kingdom
Bundesverband der Deutschen In-
dustrie (BDI)
15 Business Associations Germany
GDV 14 Business Associations Germany
Confederation of Finnish Indus-
tries
12 Business Associations Finland
ZGV 8 Business Associations Germany
Ministry of Employment and the
Economy
8 Public Authorities Finland
EuroCommerce 8 Business Associations Belgium
Anonymous 8 Other Users United Kingdom
European Issuers 8 Business Associations Belgium
Anonymous 8 Companies Germany
Anonymous 5 Investors Poland
Deutscher Industrie- und Handel-
skammertag e. V.
5 Business Associations Germany
Die Fuhrungskrafte (DFK) Haupt-
geschaftsfuhrer
5 Business Associations Germany
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen
Arbeitgeberverbande (BDA)
5 Business Associations Germany
German Brands Association 5 Business Associations Germany
Unilever 1 Companies Germany
VDMA 1 Business Associations Germany
Table D.1: List of scores by organization, sorted from high to
low.
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Figure D.1: Histogram of first component from the PCA, scaled from 1 to 100.
Dotted red line denotes mean value.
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